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MAINTAINING SECRET GOVERNMENT DOSSIERS ON
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN
CITIZENS: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVACY ACT*

"[O]pinion, and the just maintenance of it, shall never be a crime in
my view: nor bring injury on the individual."
-Thomas Jefferson'
INTRODUCTION

On April 23, 1990, two brothers traveled to the federal district

courthouse in Chicago to testify as defense witnesses against an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent at a suppression hearing in a criminal tax case. 2 Shortly after the agent noticed the brothers' presence
outside the courtroom, the prosecution requested, and was granted, a
lengthy continuance. 3 One week later, the IRS sent audit notices to
two of the three brothers. 4 Suspecting that the issuance of the notices
was nothing more than an attempt to intimidate them from testifying,
the brothers began an administrative process that culminated in the
filing of individual lawsuits against the IRS5 pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act 6 (FOIA) and the Privacy Act 7 (Act). Little did
the brothers dream, that four years later they would be arguing pro se
before a distinguished Seventh Circuit panel, which included Chief
Judge Richard Posner, Judge Thomas Fairchild, and Judge Joel Flaum,
* The author respectfully dedicates this work to his two brothers, Tom and Jeff, without
whose support and courage in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds this Comment would
never have been written. See Eccl. 4:9-10, 12. The author also wishes to thank Professor Susan
E. Thrower for reviewing the manuscript and for her many helpful suggestions.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Adams (Mar. 29, 1801), in THE LiE AND SnLECrED WRrrNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 564 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).

2. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement at Exhibit N,
Becker v. IRS, Nos. 91 C 1203-1205 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 19, 1991).
3. See id.
4. See id. Jeffrey and Steven Becker were sent audit notices on this occasion. See Becker v.
IRS, 34 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1994). The third brother, Thomas Becker, had been assigned a
revenue agent, but was not mailed a notice. See id.
5. See Steven Becker v. IRS, No. 91 C 1205 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 26, 1991); Jeffrey Becker v.
IRS, No. 91 C 1204 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 26, 1991); Thomas Becker v. IRS, No. 91 C 1203 (N.D.
I1l., filed Feb. 26, 1991).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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on an issue of first impression 8 regarding the Act's law enforcement
activity exception 9 and the government's policy of maintaining records
concerning the protected First Amendment activities of American
citizens.
Title 5 of the United States Code section 552a(e)(7) provides, in
pertinent part: "Each agency that maintains a system of records shall...maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment ...unless pertinent to and within
the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 10 It was predicted that "[tlhe restriction on collection of information relating to
the exercise of First Amendment rights may be the most controversial
area of Privacy Act litigation in future years."'" This assessment was
remarkably accurate, except for the fact that the present debate focused on the maintenance, rather than the collection, of First Amendment records.
In Becker v. IRS,' 2 the Seventh Circuit made a ground-breaking decision in holding that the IRS had illegally maintained First Amendment records in the brothers' tax files' 3 and in ordering the documents
expunged. 14 However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) lost no time
in finding a favorable forum in which to challenge the decision, which
the DOJ begrudgingly described as "the most strict application of the
law enforcement exception to date."' 5 In J. Roderick MacArthur
Foundation v. FBI,16 a two-to-one decision, the District of Columbia
Circuit majority directly criticized the reasoning of Becker17 and tendered a novel statutory interpretation of section 552a(e)(7) in denying
8. Both parties agreed that the case raised an issue of first impression under the Privacy Act.
See Brief for Appellants at 34, Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-2475); audio
tape: Becker, Oral Argument (Jan. 5, 1994) (on file with the Clerk of the Court, United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit); see also infra note 251 and accompanying text.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994).
10. Id. In addition to the law enforcement activity exception, subsection (e)(7) permits agencies to maintain First Amendment records on individuals if"expressly authorized by statute or
by the individual about whom the record is maintained." Id. For a compilation of cases arising
under these exceptions, see OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 702-03 (Sept. 1998 ed.)
[hereinafter OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY].
11. 2 JAMEs T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DIscLOsURE § 21.03, at 21-12 (2d ed.

1990).
12. 34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1994); see Ian Comisky & Miriam L. Fisher, Civil and Criminal Tax
Penalties, 48 TAX LAW. 1121, 1124 (1995) (listing Becker as one of the "Important Developments" during the year).
13. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 409.
14. See id.
15. OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, supra note 10, at 704.

16. 102 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
17. See id. at 602-03.
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the appellant relief. 18 In dissent, Circuit Judge David S. Tatel methodically rebutted the suppositions upon which the majority based its
opinion. 19
It is critical that the present conflict between the circuits be resolved
in favor of the holding in Becker and against the aberrant decision in
MacArthur Foundation. Otherwise, the law enforcement activity exception of section 552a(e)(7) will swallow the rule and the government will again, with impunity, return to its former practice of
assembling secret dossiers on the First Amendment activities of
American citizens,2 0 creating lists of political enemies, 2 1 and targeting
law-abiding individuals for harassment, prosecution, incarceration, or
22
worse.
Part II of this Comment will contain a prefatory description of the
events that led to the creation of the Act 23 and examine the legislative
background surrounding the evolution of section 552a(e)(7) and its
law enforcement activity exception. 24 Part II will also include a brief
overview of the right of association 2 5 and review the leading appellate
decisions 26 that addressed the exception prior to Becker.27 Part III
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id. at 603-04.
See id. at 607-08 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
Following the FBI's now infamous siege at Ruby Ridge, the government criminally prose-

cuted Randy Weaver; he was acquitted on all major charges. See JESS WALTER, EVERY KNEE
SHALL Bow: THE TRUTH AND TRAGEDY OF RUBY RIDGE AND THE RANDY WEAVER FAMILY

332-33, 440 (1996). During the trial, Gerry Spence, Weaver's defense counsel, questioned FBI
sniper Lon Horiuchi, who had killed Vicki Weaver in the standoff by shooting her in the head
while she was holding her baby in her arms, about whether he was told that Mrs. Weaver was
more extreme in her beliefs than Randy, thereby intimating that Vicki may have been targeted
by the government for her views. See id. at 242-43, 404. In this regard, it is noteworthy that,
more than a year prior to the beginning of the siege, the United States Marshals Service had
created a profile on Vicki Weaver in which it asserted that she was the real force behind Randy
Weaver's resistance and, without Vicki, Randy would quickly succumb to the government's demands. See id. at 160; see also DAVID B. KOPEL & PAUL H. BLACKMAN, No MORE WACOS:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HOW TO Fix IT 37-38 (1997) (noting
that Bo Gritz, who acted as a negotiator at Ruby Ridge, "mentioned an FBI psychological profile, prepared before the attack, which called Vicki Weaver the 'dominant member' of the family,
thus implying that if she were 'neutralized' everyone else might surrender"). The profile was
developed from a review of scriptural passages quoted by Mrs. Weaver, her religious beliefs, and
letters of protest she had sent to the government, all forms of expression specifically protected
by the First Amendment. See WALTER, supra, at 154-57, 160-61; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 72-133 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 134-149 and accompanying text.
26. This Comment is restricted to an analysis of appellate decisions that deal specifically with
the exercise of core political expression and does not address those holdings that interpret the
law enforcement activity exception within an employment context, which, due to the nature of
the unique relationship involved, generally utilize a different rationale in their analysis. See, e.g.,
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will describe the Becker and MacArthur Foundationdecisions in detail

and the contrasting interpretations employed by the majority and dissent in the latter case. 28 Part IV will argue that the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Becker and the reasoning in Judge Tatel's dissent in MacArthur Foundation have remained faithful to the intent of the drafters of
the Act and should be adopted.29 Part V will consider the grave consequences for the privacy rights of American citizens if the analysis of
the MacArthur Foundation majority is accepted, including the estab-

lishment of an oppressive, political police state that will reproduce ex30
ponentially with our expanding new technology.
II.

BACKGROUND

In order to appreciate the significance of the present dispute surrounding the "law enforcement activity" exception to section
552a(e)(7), it is necessary to understand the unique political climate in
which the Federal Privacy Act was passed. In addition, it is necessary
to examine the various interpretations given to the exception by the
reviewing courts.
A.

Factors Influencing the Passage of the Privacy Act of 1974

Without doubt, one of the most important factors that influenced
Congress to enact the Privacy Act 3' in 1974 was the explosion in computer technology. 32 In the legislative findings that accompanied the
Nagel v. HEW, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that federal agency did not
violate section (e)(7) by retaining records about an employee for disciplinary purposes or for
assessing job performance); Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 920-22 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(remanding case for determination of whether employees suffered adverse effects from the bureau's making of a videotape of the meeting in which analysts lodged work-related complaints),
after remand, 558 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1982) (granting judgment to defendants), affd, 732 F.2d
181 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Abernethy v. IRS, 909 F. Supp. 1562, 1569-70 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (validating
agency's maintenance of newspaper article involving employee and notice of potential class action suit for potential disciplinary use), affd, 108 F.3d 343 (11th Cir. 1997); cf. Doe v. FBI, 936
F.2d 1346, 1360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (concluding that a report concerning a statement allegedly
made on a radio talk show and memorandum regarding a political demonstration fell within the
law enforcement activity exception in suit by a physician who was denied appointment to a
federal medical position); Gregory R. Firehock, Chapter, The Increased Invulnerabilityof Incorrect Records Maintained by Law Enforcement Agencies: Doe v. FBI, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV.

1509, 1534-42 (1992) (criticizing Doe for borrowing the "law enforcement purpose" test used in
evaluating section (b)(7) of FOIA and applying it in a Privacy Act context).
27. See infra notes 150-216 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 217-297 and accompanying text.

29. See infra notes 298-425 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 426-440 and accompanying text.

31. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
32. See 1 Jusr-n D. FRANKLIN & ROBERT F. BoucHARD, GUIrDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AcTs § 2.02, at 2-18.3 (2d ed. 1999) (highlighting congressional
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Act,33 Congress specifically listed the advancements in computer sophistication as a cause for grave alarm in the area of individual privacy. 34 Similarly, in his remarks introducing Senate Bill 3418,35
Senator Samuel J. Ervin, Jr. stressed the urgency of passing a privacy
protection law: "Congress must act before sophisticated new systems
of information gathering and retention are developed, and before they
produce widespread abuses. The peculiarity of new complex technologies is that once they go into operation, it is too late to correct our
mistakes or supply our oversight. '36 In the House, Representative
William S. Moorhead, a leading sponsor of House Bill 16373, 37 cited a
1974 study indicating that the Federal Government had over 850 data

banks, of which more than 700 were computerized. 38 These data
banks contained at least 1.25 billion records on individuals. 39 In this
regard, legislators were concerned with the potential for the collection

and maintenance of incorrect and irrelevant information on individuconcern regarding computerized data banks). Computerization played a central role in the passage of the Privacy Act because
record retention systems were less threatening to the public and Congress when handheld index cards required hours of search and retrieval. Instant histories on the individual bred instant and damaging errors and the public found that it was easier for computers to control people than for people to control the computer data systems.
2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 20.01, at 20-5. See Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview
and Critique,1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 669-74 [hereinafter Privacy Act Critique] (describing the
relationship between the advance in computer technology and the threat to individual privacy).
33. The congressional findings and statement of purpose were not codified, but are listed as a
note to section 552a. See 2 BURT A. BRAVERMAN & FRANCES J. CHETWYND, INFORMATION

LAW § 21-1.1, at 777 n.19 (1985).
34. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 2(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974), reprinted
in Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations and House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (Pub. L. No. 93-579),
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, at 501 (Joint Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]

("[T]he increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology ... has greatly
magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use,
or dissemination of personal information.").
35. See infra Part II.B.1.
36. 120 CONG. REC. 12,646 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,

supra note 34, at 5. See 2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 20.01, at 20-4 ("Supporting advocates also
made the point that the time was technically ripe for such legislation, since the advancement of
computer software past 1974 would increasingly move farther away from feasibility of privacy
controls, unless a case was promptly made for the application of such controls to systems.").
37. See infra Part II.B.2.
38. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,644 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 884; Privacy Act Critique,supra note 32, at 670 & n.14.
39. See Privacy Act Critique, supra note 32, at 670 ("A 1974 study of fifty-four federal agencies disclosed 858 computerized data banks containing 1.25 billion records on individual citizens.
The FBI's National Crime Information Center alone contained over 1.7 million files and 195
million sets of fingerprints."); cf.2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 20.01, at 20-3 (noting that federal
agencies maintained an estimated 2.8 billion records on individuals at time of debate on Privacy
Act).
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als 40

and the inevitable creation by bureaucrats of government dossiers on the American citizenry.41 In addition, the General Services
Administration's proposal of FEDNET, a colossal, centralized computer system designed to coordinate the data processing and communications operations of various federal agencies, 42 lent further
43
immediacy to existing privacy concerns.
Another major impetus for the passage of the Act was the revelations arising out of the Watergate investigations.4 4 The reports issued
by both the Senate and the House made reference to disclosures
forthcoming from these proceedings, which included allegations of
"improper access, transfer and disclosure of personal files and of unconstitutional, illegal or improper investigation of and collection of
40. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,914 (1974) (statement of Sen. Huddleston), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 832 ("Technology is again advancing, this time in the form of computers.
This new technology brings with it, as advancements often do, the possibility for negligent use or
deliberate misuse. This is what we must guard against."). "[F]ederal agencies quickly seized the
opportunity to acquire huge quantities of personal information, much of it irrelevant to any
legitimate government duty. Moreover, unqualified investigators often solicited data from third
parties and compiled dossiers replete with information that was inaccurate, biased, or simply
fabricated by the investigator." Privacy Act Critique, supra note 32, at 672.
41. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,894 (1974) (statement of Sen. Percy), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,

supra note 34, at 776. "I hope that we never see the day when a bureaucrat in Washington or
Chicago or Los Angeles can use his organization's computer facilities to assemble a complete
dossier of all known information about an individual. But, I fear that is the trend." Id., reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 776. See PrivacyAct Critique,supra note 32, at 671 (pointing
out that "[t]he most obvious danger is the computer's ability to combine scattered bits of data
into a comprehensive personal dossier").
42. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,914-15 (1974) (statement of Sen. Huddleston), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 832.

43. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 10-11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6925-26,
and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 163-64 (comparing FEDNET with a nuclear reactor and
underscoring the need to assess "the fallout hazards of FEDNET to traditional freedoms").
During the debate on Senate Bill 3418, Senator Huddleston made the following comments regarding FEDNET:
Without proper safeguards, vast amounts of personal information retained by the various agencios would be instantly available at hundreds of terminals scattered throughout
the United States. And that information covers every spectrum-educational, medical,
financial and judicial-of the lives of hundreds of thousands of private citizens. Fortunately this system has been temporarily sidetracked. But the threat of "Big Brother"
was clearly there.
120 CONG. REC. 36,915 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 832. Similar privacy

concerns are presently being raised about the FBI's proposed "Digital Storm" and "enterprise
database" systems. See Robert O'Harrow Jr., FBI Plans Systems Upgrade, Cm. StrN-TiMEs,
Apr. 6, 2000, at 20.
44. See 2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 20.01, at 20-3 to 20-4 (citing Watergate as a "major
reason" for passage of the Act, but noting that Watergate simply provided the vehicle, not the
rationale, to secure support for enactment); cf. 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 32,

§ 2.03[1], at 2-18.6 to 2-19 (pointing out that while allegations surfacing from Watergate aided in
passage of the Act, the focus on the impeachment process impeded enactment because it left
minimal time for consideration of pending legislation).
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personal information on individuals. ''45 In a similar vein, Senator
Gaylord Nelson referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) COINTELPRO operation, a clandestine program in which the
FBI conducted undercover surveillance and disrupted political and religious groups that it viewed as threatening. 46 Legislators also cited
the DOJ's practice of wiretapping citizens without a warrant under
the guise of national security 47 and the McCarthy era that followed
48
the intense Cold War period.
45. S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 5, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6920, and in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 158. House Report 93-1416 emphasized the significance of the Watergate hearings in the following manner:
Additional impetus in Congress to enact privacy safeguards into law has resulted from
recent revelations connected with Watergate-related investigations, indictments, trials,
and convictions. They included such activities as the break-in at the Democratic National Committee's headquarters in June 1972, the slowly emerging series of revelations
of "White House enemies' lists," the break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the misuse of CIA-produced "personality profiles" on Elisberg, the wiretapping of
the phones of government employees and news reporters, and surreptitious taping of
personal conversations within the Oval Office of the White House as well as political
surveillance, spying, and "mail covers."
H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, at 8-9 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 301-02.
46. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,900 (1974) (attributing remarks to Senator Nelson, although
SOURCE BOOK identifies speaker as Senator Muskie), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34,
at 794. Senator Nelson described the FBI's disruption tactics as follows:
[The FBI's COINTELPRO] activities included sending false and anonymous letters to
discredit selected individuals in the eyes of their peers, informing an employer of the
individual's membership in a particular group so that the individual might be fired, and
passing on information to credit bureaus to harm the individual economically.
Id., reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 794.
COINTELPRO was the FBI's acronym for "counterintelligence program." See S. REP. No.
94-755, bk. 3, at 4 (1976). The Senate Report characterized COINTELPRO as "a sophisticated
vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of
speech and association, on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the
propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence." Id. at 3.
For an overview of the targets, goals, and techniques of COINTELPRO, see id. at 1-77.
The specter of COINTELPRO has recently resurfaced in the FBI's secret VAAPCON project.
VAAPCON, which is an acronym for Violence Against Abortion Providers Conspiracy, is a
database maintained "under the auspices of the Criminal Division" that contains dossiers on
such peaceful pro-life organizations as the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Reverend
Pat Robertson's Christian Coalition, and Concerned Women for America. Paul M. Rodriguez,
FBI Database Monitors Catholic Bishops, Pro-Life Groups, INSIGHT, July 17, 2000, at 6. Under
the pretense of tracking "domestic terrorism," VAAPCON was used by the Justice Department
to monitor and compile information on the protected religious and political beliefs of numerous
law-abiding groups. See id. The illegal nature of this criminal database is evidenced by the fact
that religious organizations were profiled under a VAAPCON entry heading that indicated they
were "NOT PARTICIPATING IN DIRECT ACTION." Id.
47. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,901 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 796.
48. See H.R. REp. No. 93-1416, at 4-5 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at
297-98.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:675

An additional factor affecting consideration of the Act was the revelation of flagrant abuses by the IRS in monitoring tax records for
political purposes. 49 During the four-year period preceding introduction of the major privacy bills in 1974, the IRS performed law enforcement intelligence-gathering functions and conducted surveillance
on 3,000 politically active groups and 8,000 individual taxpayers.5 0
A special unit of the IRS, known as the "Special Service Staff,"
was created in order to provide the administration with access
to confidential taxpayer information on its political enemies. 51
In addition, the IRS' practice of furnishing private records to
other agencies was so blatant that one senator compared the agency
to a public lending library. 52 This latter practice led to
the passage of Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 6103, 53 which
This author had the unique honor and privilege of training under attorney Robert L. Collins,
deceased, formerly of Wheaton, Illinois. Mr. Collins, who practiced law for more than 50 years,
was one of the final four candidates under consideration for the position of counsel to Senator
Joseph McCarthy during the now-famous committee investigations of the early half of the 1950s.
See generally CHESLY MANLY, TH-E TWENrY-YEAR REVOLUTION 223-42 (1954) (giving overview
of McCarthy investigations). Interestingly, under the Ichord Amendment to House Bill 16373,
which created the law enforcement activity exception of section 552a(e)(7), records similar to
those obtained by Senator McCarthy can be lawfully collected and maintained by federal agencies pursuant to the present Act. See infra Part IV.D.
49. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,900 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 794. Following Senator Nelson's remarks, Senator Jackson further condemned
the IRS' practices:
The use of the IRS to perform unauthorized law enforcement type functions for essentially political purposes is a flagrant and inexcusable abuse of power. This action undermines public confidence which is absolutely essential if the IRS is to perform its job
of administering the tax laws. More importantly, it runs counter to fundamental values
of freedom of expression and equal treatment under the law to have an agency of Government collecting data to be used against organizations with political views that are
not favored by the current administration.
Id. at 36,903 (statement of Sen. Jackson), reprintedin SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 801. The
"Filegate" scandal surrounding the Clinton administration's improper access to FBI files for use
in targeting political enemies circulated very similar allegations to those mentioned above. See
Judicial Watch Cases, (visited July 17, 2000) at http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/filegate/index.htm (updating progress of and revelations uncovered in "Filegate" class-action suit); see also
Robert L. Jackson, Judge: White House Violated Willey's Privacy, Cin. SUN-TiMEs, Mar. 30,
2000, at 23 (citing court's ruling that President Clinton "committed a criminal violation of the
privacy act").
50. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,900 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 794.
51. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,903 (1974) (statement of Sen. Jackson), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 800-01; 120 CONG. REC. 36,900 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 794.
52. 120 CONG. REC. 36,901 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 796.
53. I.R.C. § 6103 (West Supp. 2000).
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prohibits the IRS from disclosing confidential tax return informa54
tion.
Lastly, the Army's surveillance of civilians was described in Senate
Report 1183 as "[o]ne of the most pervasive of the intrusive information programs which have concerned the Congress and the public in
recent years."'55 Such military monitoring was explained in detail in
the Senate Report under the heading of "First Amendment Programs" and was cited therein with respect to legislative fears regarding the collection and maintenance of records describing the exercise
56
of protected constitutional activities:
Allegedly for the purpose of predicting and preventing civil disturbances which might develop beyond the control of state and local
officials, Army agents were sent throughout the country to keep
surveillance over the way the civilian population expressed [its] sentiments about government policies. In churches, on campuses, in
classrooms, in public meetings, they took notes, taperecorded, and
photographed people who dissented in thought, word or deed. This
included clergymen, editors, public officials, and anyone who sympathized with the dissenters ....

Out of this surveillance the Army created blacklists of organizations and personalities which were circulated to many federal, state
54. See DARRELL McGOWEN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR CRIMES AND INTENTIONAL
WRONGS § 5.23, at 161-62 (1993) ("Congress' main purpose in enacting §6103 was to curtail the
Internal Revenue Service's loose disclosure practices."). The Ninth Circuit described legislative
concerns with IRS leaks of confidential materials and the nature of section 6103 in the following
manner:
Congress was concerned that [the] IRS had become a "lending library" to other government agencies of tax information filed with the IRS, and feared the public's confidence in the privacy of returns filed with [the] IRS would suffer. The Senate Report
explained: "[T]he IRS probably has more information about more people than any
other agency in this country. Consequently, almost every other agency that has a need
for information... logically seeks it from the IRS." Congress also sought to end "the
highly publicized attempts to use the Internal Revenue Service for political purposes"
involving delivery of tax returns to the White House by the IRS and to regulate "the
flow of tax data from the IRS to State Governments ......
Consistent with the legislative history, the elaborate disclosure procedures of section
6103 are directed to controlling the distribution of information the IRS receives directly
from the taxpayer-information the taxpayer files under compulsion and the threat of
criminal penalties. Section 6103 establishes a comprehensive scheme for controlling
the release by the IRS of information received from taxpayers to discrete identified
parties, subject to specified conditions.
Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations and footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original). In addition, taxpayers may now bring a civil action against the United
States for the improper disclosure of confidential return information. See I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1)
(Supp. IV 1998); McGOWEN, supra, §§ 5.23-5.30, at 161-67.
55. S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6928, and in
SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 166.
56. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6928, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at
166.
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and local agencies, [which] were all requested to supplement the
data provided. Not only descriptions of the contents of speeches
and political comments were included, but irrelevant entries about
personal finances, such as the fact that a militant leader's credit card
was withdrawn. In some cases, a psychiatric diagnosis taken from
Army or other medical records was included.
This information on individuals was programmed into at least
four computers according to their political beliefs, or their memberships, or their geographic residence.
The Army did not just collect and share this information. Analysts were assigned the task of evaluating and labeling these people
on the basis of reports on their attitudes, remarks and activities.
They were then coded for entry into computers or microfilm data
banks.

57

On another occasion, Senator Ervin made note of the fact that the
most popular type of information catalogued by the Army was politi58
cal belief and associational affiliation.
59
In this regard, the Supreme Court's decision in Laird v. Tatum
directly influenced Congress in drafting the Act. 6° In Tatum, the
plaintiffs brought a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in which they alleged that the Army's domestic "surveillance of
lawful and peaceful civilian political activity" had a "'chilling' effect"
61
on the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The plaintiffs further complained that the Army's storage and distribution of the collected information constituted a blacklist, 62 and, in
the words of the Court, "armed with the fruits of those activities, the
agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to that individual. '63 The Court, however, ruled that the
57. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6929, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at
167 (quoting HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE JUDICI-

Comm., 92d Cong. (1971) (summary of Sen. Ervin)).
58. See Sen. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., Mark-Up Session, S.3418, To Create a
Federal Privacy Comm'n, 54 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 82.
59. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
60. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 83, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6997, and in SOURCE
ARY

BOOK, supra note 34, at 236.

61. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 2-3.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 11. The Court's choice of language here is extremely significant in understanding
the Act because this passage directly mirrors the text of legislative history most often cited by
the courts in construing the meaning of section 552a(e)(7): "This section's restraint is aimed
particularly at preventing collection of protected information not immediately needed, about
law-abiding Americans, on the off-chance that Government or the particular agency might possibly have to deal with them in the future." S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 57, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 210. As noted below, the Act was
passed, in part, as a reaction to, and a repudiation of, the Court's holding in Tatum. See infra
note 66 and accompanying text. Congress rejected Tatum in three recognizable areas: (1) standing; (2) military surveillance of civilians; and (3) future needs. See infra note 66 and accompany-
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plaintiffs' allegations of a subjective chill were insufficient under Article 1I164 to present a justiciable controversy. 65 This decision had a significant effect upon drafters of the Act and was specifically listed in
the Senate Report as providing the Committee with the impetus to
define the term "aggrieved person" with a view toward providing the
greatest possible standing under the case or controversy requirement.

66

ing text. First, in its Report, the Senate specifically expressed its intent to nullify Tatum's holding
limiting standing. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. Secondly, in strongly condemning
the Army's practice of monitoring civilian activities, the Senate demonstrated its disapproval of
the Tatum Court's failure to remedy a wrong that Congress viewed as intolerable under longstanding American tradition. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Thirdly, by enunciating its prohibition on the maintenance of First Amendment records for future needs, the Senate clearly rejected the Court's refusal to find a cognizable injury in the government's retention
of records collected by the Army. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Compare S.
REP. No. 93-1183, at 57, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971, and in SOURCE BooK, supra
note 34, at 210, with Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13-14 ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm.
...). In his dissent, Justice Douglas articulated the plaintiffs' fear of government
dossiers:
[T]he charge is that the purpose and effect of the system of surveillance is to harass and
intimidate the respondents and to deter them from exercising their rights of political
expression, protest, and dissent "by invading their privacy, damaging their reputations,
adversely affecting their employment and their opportunities for employment, and in
other ways." Their fear is that "permanent reports of their activities will be maintained
in the Army's data bank, and their 'profiles' will appear in the so-called 'Blacklist' and
that all of this information will be released to numerous federal and state agencies upon
request."
Tatum, 408 U.S. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id.
65. See Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
66. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 83, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6997, and in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 236. Specifically, Senate Report 1183 states:
The Committee intends the use of the term "aggrieved person" to afford the widest
possible standing consistent with the constitutional requirement of "case or controversy" in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. In this respect, the provision is
designed, among other things, to supply certain deficiencies in standing and ripeness
which the courts found in the Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973), Laird v. Tatum (408 U.S. 1(1972) [sic], and Stark v. Schultz, 42 U.S.L.W. 4481
(Apr. 1, 1974)).
Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6997, and in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 236.
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Justice William 0. Douglas issued a forceful dissent in Tatum and
argued that the Army lacked a constitutional basis upon which to conduct civilian surveillance because Congress never empowered the
Army with such a function. 67 Justice Douglas' eloquent concluding
remarks epitomized the prevailing feeling at the time of introduction
of the Act:
This case involves a cancer in our body politic. It is a measure of
the disease which afflicts us. Army surveillance, like Army regimentation, is at war with the principles of the First Amendment.
Those who already walk submissively will say there is no cause for
alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage. The First Amendment was designed to allow rebellion to remain as our heritage.
The Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of
the people. The Bill of Rights was added to keep the precincts of
belief and expression, of the press, of political and social activities
free from surveillance. The Bill of Rights was designed to keep
agents of government and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of people. The aim was to allow men to be free and independent and to assert their rights against government. There can be no
influence more paralyzing of that objective than Army surveillance.
When an intelligence officer looks over every nonconformist's
shoulder in the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line,
or infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the world no longer is cast in the image which
Jefferson and Madison designed, but more in the Russian image
68

Upon review, the common feature present in all of the aforementioned factors that influenced passage of the Act was a profound fear
concerning the collection and maintenance of information regarding
the private activities of American citizens, conduct that unavoidably
results in the creation of dossiers69 and the concomitant potential for
governmental abuse through harassment and blacklisting. 70 These
fundamental concerns were capsulized in the statement of purpose
contained in Senate Report 1183:
67. See Tatum, 408 U.S. at 27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 28-29.
69. In this regard, Senate Report 1183 quoted the following statement from Professor Arthur
Miller:
I think if one reads Orwell and Huxley carefully, one realizes that "1984" is a state of
mind. In the past, dictatorships always have come with... tanks and machineguns, but
a dictatorship of dossiers, a dictatorship of data banks can be just as repressive, just as
chilling and just as debilitating on our constitutional protections. I think it is this fear
that presents the greatest challenge to Congress right now.
S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 7 (1974) (quoting Professor Arthur Miller), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6922, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 160.
70. See id. at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6919, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34,
at 157. Senator Ervin commented on the potential for governmental abuse:
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[The Act] is designed to prevent the kind of illegal, unwise, overbroad, investigation and record surveillance of law-abiding citizens
produced in recent years from actions of some over-zealous investigators, and the curiosity of some government administrators, or the
wrongful disclosure and use, in some cases, of personal files held by
Federal agencies.
It is to prevent the secret gathering of information on people or
the creation of secret information systems or data banks on Americans by employees of the departments and agencies of the executive
branch.
It is designed to set in motion for long-overdue evaluation of the
needs of the Federal Government to acquire and retain personal
information on Americans, by requiring stricter review within agen71
cies of criteria for collection and retention.
B.

Legislative History of Section 552a(e)(7)

A critical analysis of the evolution of section 552a(e)(7) is essential
in defining the proper scope of the law enforcement activity exception
because, with respect to the Act, the usual conference committee report and its authoritative expression of legislative intent is lacking.7 2
Rather, in place of the conference report, the staffs of the House and
Senate sponsors hurriedly prepared a memorandum 73 regarding the
eleventh-hour compromise bill that became the Privacy Act.74 Due to
the inadequacy of the staff memorandum in interpreting subsection
(e)(7) 75 and the memorandum's less than binding nature, 76 a detailed
The complaints show that many Americans are more concerned than ever before
about what might be in their records because Government has abused, and may abuse,
its power to investigate and store information.
They are concerned about the transfer of information from data bank to data bank
and black list to black list because they have seen instances of it.
Id. (quoting statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6919, and in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 157.
71. Id. at 1-2, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6916-17, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34,
at 154-55.
72. See 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHtARD, supra note 32, § 2.03[4], at 2-23 to 2-24 ("The normal
procedure to follow when both houses pass differing pieces of legislation would be to meet in a
formal conference, which would draft a compromise bill and prepare a Conference Report."); 2
O'REIILY, supra note 11, § 20.03, at 20-12 to 20-13.
73. For a discussion of the staff memorandum's commentary on section 552a(e)(7), see supra
note 122 and accompanying text.
74. See 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 32, § 2.03[4], at 2-23 to 2-24; 2 O'REILLY, supra
note 11, § 20.03, at 20-9, 20-13.
75. See 2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 20.03, at 20-9 ("Instead of a conference committee, the
Privacy Act had a hastily drawn statement of staff compromises, a meeting of two senators and
two representatives, and a patchwork compromise of the details which have led to confusion and
unappreciative comments in later years from more reflective commentators.").
76. See 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 32, § 2.03[4], at 2-23 ("The Conference Report
would be the most definitive record of the legislative history and intent of the law as enacted.");
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assessment of the legislative development of the law enforcement activity exception, especially the Ichord Amendment, 77 is required.
1.

Senate Bill 3418

On May 1, 1974, Senators Ervin, Percy, and Muskie introduced Senate Bill 341878 to create a Federal Privacy Board, regulate the collection and disclosure of information regarding individuals, and provide
governmental management systems. 7 9 Section 201(a)(13) of the original bill read as follows:
Any Federal agency, State or local government, or any other organization maintaining an information system that includes personal
information shall-

. . .

collect no personal information concerning

the political or religious beliefs, affiliations, and activities of data
subjects which is maintained, used or disseminated in or by any information system80 operated by any governmental agency, unless authorized by law.

On September 26, 1974, a revised version of Senate Bill 3418 was
reported by the Committee on Government Operations.8 ' Former
section 201(a)(13) became section 201(b)(7) in the updated draft, and
the prohibition against the collection of personal information regarding political or religious beliefs, affiliations, and activities was expanded to include a ban on the establishment of any program
designed to collect or maintain records on how individuals exercised
their First Amendment rights: 82
2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 20.03, at 20-13 ("The memorandum is less persuasive than a conference committee report because it is the history of views of four legislators and a group of staff

members, not expressly adopted by the committees or the Houses of Congress.").
77. See infra Part II.B.3.
78. S. 3418, 93d Cong. (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 9-28.
79. See 120 CONG. REC. 12,646 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 3.
80. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201(a)(13), reprinted in SoURcE BOOK, supra note 34, at 13, 15.
81. See S. 3418, 93d Cong. (Sept. 26, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 97150.
82. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6917, and in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 155 (pointing out that Senate Bill 3418 charges agencies "[t]o
establish no program for collecting or maintaining information on how people exercise First
Amendment rights"). The Senate Report boldly attempted to illustrate the spectrum of First
Amendment freedoms that subsection (b)(7) was intended to protect:
[This subsection] is directed at programs which would (1) require gathering of such data
from other agencies or (2) would require questions to be asked of the subject individual
or of others about his or her personal political beliefs and philosophy, about legitimate
activities of the individual in participating in community events, in religious practices,
in seeking redress of grievances through such methods as signing petitions to be sent to
Government agencies, Members of Congress or State legislatures; picketing under lawful circumstances; associating with others of like mind for the purposes of exchanging
social, economic or political views; engaging in lawful demonstrations with others of
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Each Federal agency that maintains an information system or file
shall, with respect to each such system or file-.., establish no program for the purpose of collecting or maintaining information
describing how individuals exercise rights guaranteed by the first
amendment unless the head of the agency specifically determines
that such program is required for the administration of a statute
which the agency is charged with administering or implementing. 83
Senate Report 1183, 84 which accompanied the Committee on Government Operation's September 26, 1974 version of Senate Bill 3418,
provides extensive commentary on subsection (b)(7) and is the source
most consistently consulted by the courts in construing congressional
intent regarding section 552a(e)(7). 85 The report notes that subsection (b)(7) reflected the "preferred status" to be accorded First
Amendment exercise by the managers of technology and was aimed at
ensuring privacy to citizens in their "thoughts, habits, attitudes and
beliefs." 86 In the most oft-quoted section of the report's description
of subsection (b)(7), 87 the Committee pointed out that "[tjhis section's
restraint is aimed particularly at preventing collection of protected information not immediately needed, about law-abiding Americans, on
the off-chance that Government or the particular agency might possibly have to deal with them in the future." 88
On November 21, 1974, the Committee's version of Senate Bill 3418
was debated by the entire Senate. 89 In addition to concerns being
voiced about the creation of dossiers 90 and the compilation of enemy
lists, 91 a committee amendment to subsection (b)(7) was submitted for
the purpose of narrowing the existing exception to apply only when
"such information is relevant and necessary to carry out a statutory
like mind for the purpose of expressing opinions about governmental, social or economic policies; or expressing written or spoken opinions about such matters through
the press, including letters to editors and comments on radio and television programs.
Id. at 57, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 210.
83. S.3418, 93d Cong. § 201(b)(7), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK,supra note 34, at 129, 130.
84. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6916-6999, and in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 34, at 151-238.
85. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
86. S.REP.No. 93-1183, at 56, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971, and in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 209.
87. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
88. S.REP.No. 93-1183, at 57, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971, and in SOURCE BooK,
supra note 34, at 210.
89. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,885-917 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 763838.
90. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,894 (1974) (statement of Sen. Percy), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 776.
91. See id. at 36,915 (statement of Sen. Huddleston), reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note
34, at 832.
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purpose of the agency."' 92 As a result, the final Senate version of section 201(b)(7), which was passed by the full Senate on November 21,
1974, 93 read as follows:
Each Federal agency that maintains an information system or file
shall, with respect to each such system or file-. . . establish no program for the purpose of collecting or maintaining information
describing how individuals exercise rights guaranteed by the [Flirst
[A]mendment unless the head of the agency specifically determines
and necessary to carry out a statuthat such information is relevant
94
tory purpose of the agency.
2.

House Bill 16373 Prior to the Ichord Amendment

On August 12, 1974, Representative Moorhead, on behalf of thirteen co-sponsors, introduced House Bill 1637395 to "safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of Federal records" and to ensure that
individuals are granted access to their records. 96 Section 5(a) of the
House Bill proposed to amend Title 44 of the United States Code by
inserting section 3506a which stated: "No Federal agency shall maintain any record concerning the political or religious belief or activity
of any individual, unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained." 97
On October 2, 1974, a revised version of House Bill 16373 was reported by the Committee on Government Operations,9" which, while
relocating the political and religious prohibition provision to section 3
as the new proposed section 552a(e)(4) to Title 5, made little substantive change to the former draft. 99 House Report 1416100 was fairly
cursory in its treatment of subsection (e)(4) and simply noted that the
provision was designed to "prohibit[ ] the maintenance of any record
under this Act which concerns the political or religious beliefs or activities of any individual as defined by this Act unless the individual
92. Id. at 36,890, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 767.
93. See id. at 36,917, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 838; 1 FRANKLIN &
BOUCHARD, supra note 32, § 2.03[2], at 2-19.
94. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201(b)(7) (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 348,
350.
95. H.R. 16373, 93d Cong. (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 239-57.
96. Id., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 239.
97. Id. § 5(a), reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 256.
98. See H.R. 16373, 93d Cong. (Oct. 2, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at
258-293.
99. See id. § 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 278, 283, 285 (proposing new
section 552a(e)(4) to Title 5) ("Each agency that maintains a system of records shall-. . . maintain no record concerning the political or religious belief or activity of any individual, unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained.").
100. H.R. REP. No. 93-1416 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 294-333.
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authorizes the maintenance of such record or unless the maintenance
of such record is expressly authorized by statute."10 1
3.

The Ichord Amendment

On November 20 and 21, 1974, House Bill 16373 was debated on
the floor of the House. 102 During Representative Moorhead's introductory remarks at the commencement of the discussions held on November 20, he referred to the protections in subsection (e)(4) in the
following manner:
I am going to say something very important now, especially in
light of disclosures during the last week or so on the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service. H.R. 16373 also
prohibits the Government from keeping secret personal information
systems and collecting records on political and religious beliefs.
This proposed statute would thus provide greater safeguards for
protecting the lawful exercise of first amendment rights. 10 3
This statement provoked a discussion between Representatives David
W. Dennis and William S. Moorhead. 1°4 Dennis repeatedly pressed
Moorhead to confirm whether the bill would prevent the FBI from
keeping lists on Communists or other like groups that advocated the
violent overthrow of the United States Government.10 5 After some
debate, Moorhead assured Dennis that the provision in question
101. Id. at 16, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 309.
102. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,643-60, 36,955-77 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note
34, at 880-984.
103. Id. at 36,644 (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at
883-84.
104. See id. at 36,644-45, reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 885-86.
105. See id., reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 885-86. The verbatim debate between the two congressmen concerning the scope of subsection (e)(4)'s prohibition against the
maintenance of records concerning an individual's political or religious beliefs or activities was
as follows:
Mr. DENNIS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. With reference to the gentleman's
statement that this would keep the Government from maintaining records as to political beliefs, would this bill prevent the Federal Bureau of Investigation from maintaining
a list of Communist Party members or people who belong to organizations which are
dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Government, or anything of that sort?
Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. Lawful criminal investigations of that type would be
exempt from the bill, but normal dissidents, exercising first amendment rights, would
be covered.
Mr. DErnIs. If it hinged on the criminal field, it would come under the exemption
which was referred to earlier?
Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. The gentleman is correct.
Mr. DENNIS. And would the gentleman agree that if it dealt with individuals or organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Government, that that would fall
within the criminal exemption?
Mr. MOORmAD of Pennsylvania. Anything that falls within the criminal exemption is
taken care of. We have tried to prepare it very carefully.
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would not prohibit the FBI from keeping such records under the criminal exemption.' °6 This exchange was significant because it directly
foreshadowed the Ichord Amendment to section 552a(e)(4). 10 7
On November 20, 1974, Representative Richard H. Ichord of Missouri offered a "clarifying amendment" to section 552a(e)(4). 10 8 In
essence, the language of this amendment, with minor modifications,
constitutes the present-day "law enforcement activity" exception to
subsection (e)(7) of the Act; therefore, a precise understanding of the
scope of the amendment is essential in order to accurately interpret
the meaning of the exception contained in section 552a(e)(7).10 9 Accordingly, and especially in light of the fact that a conference committee report was never issued, the terms and purpose of the amendment
as proposed by Representative Ichord must be examined in detail:
This subsection and paragraph [subsection (e), paragraph (4)] prohibits an agency from maintaining any record, and I quote, "concerning the political or religious belief or activity of any individual,
unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about
whom the record is maintained." We may well recognize that the
purpose of this provision is commendable and legitimate in prohibiting the disclosure of records with respect to conventional political
and religious beliefs and activities. However, in its present form it is
clear that the provisions can be construed to cover activities which
are properly within the scope of legitimate law enforcement. I am
assured that the authors of this measure have not intended the provisions to foreclose this proper purpose.
Mr. DENNIs. Activity dedicated to violent overthrow of the Government would fall
under criminal exemption, would the gentleman agree with me on that?
Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. Yes. That is what I am saying.
Id., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 885-86.
106. See id. at 36,645 (response of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34,
at 886; see also debate supra note 105. The "criminal exemption" referred to during this debate
was most likely section 552a(j) and/or section 552a(k). See H.R. 16373, 93d Cong. §§ 552a(j)552a(k) (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 289-91.
107. See infra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
108. 120 CONG. REC. 36,650 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ichord), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 900-01.
109. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994) ("Each agency that maintains a system of records
shall- . . . maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment ... unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity.") (emphasis added), with H.R. 16373, 93d Cong. § 552a(e)(4) (1974), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 383, 385. The language of section 552a(e)(4) was as follows:
Each agency that maintains a system of records shall-.., maintain no record concerning the political or religious belief or activity of any individual .... Provided,however,
That the provisions of this paragraphshall not be deemed to prohibitthe maintenance of
any record of activity which is pertinent to and within the scope of a duly authorized law
enforcement activity.
H.R. 16373 § 552a(e)(4) (emphasis added), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 383,
385.
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The terms of the broad prohibitions on maintenance of records
relating to "political" and "religious" activities would, for example,
embrace the activities of the Communist Party and similar groups,
which, although generally recognized as conspiratorial or clandestine, are nevertheless commonly described as "political." Similarly,
certain sects within the Black Muslim movement, which have been
described by the Director of the FBI as endangering the internal
security, may claim protection under this clause as a "religious"
activity.
Although those records of political or religious activity which are
"expressly authorized by statute," are excepted from the prohibitions of this paragraph, this is not adequate to exempt the activities
of such subversive groups as I have indicated. I know of no existing
or enforceable statute which expressly and generally authorizes any
particular agency to maintain the records of political or religious
activities of subversive groups. I would therefore amend this paragraph by striking out the period after the word "maintained" and
add the following: ";provided, however, that the provisions of this
paragraph shall not be deemed to prohibit the maintenance of any
record of activity which is pertinent to and within the scope of a
duly authorized law enforcement activity." I believe this clarifying
amendment would obviate any ambiguities as to the reach of the
prohibition, and would serve to eliminate any adverse litigation on
the subject. 110
After offering an amendment to section 552a(k), 111 and attempting to
provide a definition for the term "law enforcement" as used in both
amendments, 1 2 Representative Ichord made the following
declaration:
I want to emphasize-so that there is no misunderstanding-these
changes are designed to protect only legitimate national or internal
security intelligence and investigations, and no records or files shall

be kept on persons which are not within constitutional limitations.
Let the legislative history be explicit. None of these changes are
intended to abridge the exercise of first amendment rights. The
110. 120 CONG. REC. 36,650 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 900-01.
Ironically, with reference to Congressman Ichord's final remark, it is this particular exception to
the Act's prohibition on the maintenance of First Amendment records that has been the subject
of the majority of litigation under this section in the last 25 years.
111. See id. at 36,650-61, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 901-02.
112. See id. at 36,651, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 902. One commentator
has noted that, in the future, the most likely subject of litigation concerning the prohibition on
the government's collection of First Amendment records will be the definition of "authorized
law enforcement activity." See 2 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 21.03, at 21-12. In this regard,
during his remarks following the several amendment proposals, Representative Ichord stated:
"In referring to a 'law enforcement activity' and 'law enforcement purposes,' I am, of course,
using the expression 'law enforcement' in its general meaning .
120 CONG. REC. 36,651
(1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 902.
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rights of Americans to dissent
in a lawful manner and for lawful
1 13
purposes must be preserved.

On November 21, 1974, during the continuation of the House debate, Representative Ichord formally offered his amendment to subsection (e)(4). 114 Following a final assurance by Representative
Ichord to Representative Moorhead that the amendment "is not in-

tended to hurt in any way the exercise of the [F]irst [A]mendment
rights,"115 the House agreed to the amendment. 16 House Bill 16373
was passed by an almost unanimous House on November 21, 1974.117
The final House version of section 552a(e)(4) read as follows:
113. 120 CONG REC. 36,651 (emphasis added), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at

902-03. The emphasized language in this passage is critical to an assessment of the correctness of
the courts' interpretation to date of the scope of the law enforcement activity exception. See
infra Part IV.D.
114. Representative Ichord's remarks on this occasion iterated many of the concepts he raised
during his speech on the previous day:
Mr. Chairman, as I pointed out in general debate this amendment can be described
as a clarifying amendment. The managers of the bill have stated that they did not
intend to do what I questioned they might be doing, and this language was worked out
in cooperation with the managers of the bill. It is really to make certain that political
and religious activities are not used as a cover for illegal or subversive activities.
In its present form paragraph (4) would prohibit any agency from maintaining any
record concerning the "political or religious belief or activity" of any individual, unless
"expressly authorized by statute" or by the individual. The use of the terms "expressly
authorized by statute" would seem to indicate that unless the statute by specific
terms-rather than by "implication"-authorized the agency to maintain such a record,
maintenance would be prohibited, and that this would therefore have the effect of
prohibiting the maintenance of records concerning Communist and other subversive
organizations on the theory that they are engaged in "political" activities.
We may well recognize that the purpose of the provision is commendable and legitimate in prohibiting the disclosure of such records with respect to conventional political
and religious beliefs and activities, but that it can be construed to cover activities which
are properly within the scope of legitimate law enforcement. For example, the Communist Party and similar groups may claim that they are within the scope of the provision of this paragraph as a "political" activity. Similarly, certain sects within the Black
Muslim movement, which are engaged in activities described by the Director of the FBI
as endangering the internal security, may claim exemption as a "religious" belief.
It is the purpose of the amendment to make clear that such activities as are pertinent
to, and within the scope of, duly authorized law enforcement activities are not meant to
be excluded by the broad terms of paragraph (4). It is simply a clarifying amendment,
so that we obviate any necessity for litigation on the reach of the paragraph.
Id. at 36,957, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 929. It is important to view these
remarks in context. This is especially so with respect to the Congressman's comment that his
amendment to subsection (e)(4) was really "to make certain that political and religious activities
are not used as a cover for illegal or subversive activities," language that was subsequently
quoted in the Privacy Act Guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget. See infra
Part II.C.
115. 120 CoNG. REc. 36,957 (1974), reprinted in SouRcE BooK, supra note 34, at 930.
116. See id., reprinted in SOURCE BooK, supra note 34, at 931.
117. See id. at 36,976, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 981-83; 1 FRANKLIN &
BOUCHARD, supra note 32, § 2.03[3], at 2-22.
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Each agency that maintains a system of records shallmaintain no record concerning the political or religious belief or activity
of any individual ...Provided, however, That the provisions of this
paragraph shall not be deemed to prohibit the maintenance of any
record of activity which is pertinent to and within the scope of a
duly authorized law enforcement activity. 1 18
4.

Compromise Bill

Due to the limited amount of time available prior to the end of the
legislative session and the desire to see privacy legislation enacted
quickly, the staff members of the committees that drafted the major
Senate and House bills met to study the two versions. 119 Afterwards,
Senate and House members from the respective committees met informally and agreed on a compromise. 120 Instead of the usual conference report, the staffs prepared an "Analysis of House and Senate
Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act."'1 21 With respect to the prohibition on the maintenance of "Information on Political Activities," the analysis stated:
The House bill tells agencies that they may not maintain a record
concerning the political or religious beliefs or activities of any individual unless maintenance of the record would be authorized expressly by statute or by the individual about whom the record is
maintained. The House bill goes on to provide that this subsection
is not deemed to prohibit the maintenance of any record or activity
which is pertinent to and within the scope of a duly authorized law
enforcement activity.
The Senate bill constitutes a prohibition against agency programs
established for the purpose of collecting or maintaining information
about how individuals exercise First Amendment rights unless the
agency head specifically determines that the program is required for
the administration of a statute.
The compromise broadens the House provisions [sic] application
to all First Amendment rights and directs the prohibition against the
maintenance of records. However, as in the House bill, it does permit the maintenance, use, collection or dissemination of these
records which are expressly authorized by statute or the individual
118. H.R. 16373, 93d Cong. § 3 (1974) (proposing new section 552a(e)(4) to Title 5), reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 383, 385.
119. See 120 CONG. REc. 40,400 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 845-46; id. at 40,880 (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 985-86.
120. See 120 CONG. REC.40,400 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 846; id. at 40,880 (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 986.
121. See 120 CONG. REC. 40,405-08, 40,881-83 (1974), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note
34, at 858-66, 987-94; see also supra note 74.
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are pertinent to a duly authorized law enforcement
subject or
22
activity.'

The Senate passed the compromise bill on December 17, 1974, and
the House approved the bill the following day.

23

In addition, on De-

cember 18, 1974, the Senate adopted three technical amendments, one

of which involved the placement of section 552a(e)(7). 24 President
Gerald Ford signed the Act into law on December 31, 1974.125 In its
final form, section 552a(e)(7) provided, as it does today: "Each
agency that maintains a system of records shall- . . . maintain no re-

cord describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment ... unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
26
authorized law enforcement activity.'
C.

The Office of Management and Budget Guidelines

On July 1, 1975, prior to the effective date of the Act,127 the Office

of Management and Budget (OMB) issued its Privacy Act Guidelines
(Guidelines).

28

The OMB's discussion of subsection (e)(7) was in-

cluded under the heading of "Records on Religious or Political Activities. 1' 2 9 In comparing the standard for the maintenance of documents
under subsection (e)(1),130 the Guidelines state that subsection (e)(7)
"establishes an even more rigorous standard governing the maintenance of records regarding the exercise of First Amendment

rights."' ' 3 ' In addition, the Guidelines instruct that in making the determination as to whether an activity comprises the exercise of a right
protected under the First Amendment, "agencies will apply the
broadest reasonable interpretation."'' 32 Finally, with respect to the
law enforcement activity exception, the Guidelines give the following
cursory summary:
122. Id. at 40,406, 40,881, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 860, 988.
123. See id. at 40,413, 40,886, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 877, 1001.
124. See id. at 40,730-31, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 878-79.
125. See 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 32, § 2.03[5], at 2-27.
126. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1896, 1899, 1900 (codified as 5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994)), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 504, 505.
127. The Act went into effect on September 27, 1975. See id., § 8, 88 Stat. at 1910, reprintedin
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 515.

128. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948-78 (1975), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 1015-124.
129. This title is rather curious in light of the fact that House Bill 16373's reference to religious
or political beliefs or activities was replaced in the compromise bill by the broader reference to
First Amendment rights contained in Senate Bill 3418. See supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
130. Pursuant to subsection (e)(1), an agency may maintain only such information "as is rele2
vant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 55 a(e)(1) (1994).
131. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,965 (1975), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 1073.
132. Id., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 1073.
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In the discussions on the floor of the House regarding the authority to maintain such records for law enforcement purposes, it was
stated that the objective of the law enforcement qualification on the
general prohibition was "to make certain that political and religious
activities are not used as a cover for illegal or subversive activities."
However, it was agreed that "no file would be kept of persons who
are merely exercising their constitutional rights

. .

." and that in ac-

cepting this qualification "there was no intention to interfere with
First Amendment rights. '133
D.

The Right of Association

The sanctity of the right of free association is a critical, underlying
issue in both of the subject opinions examined in this Comment. 134 In
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 35 the Supreme Court stated
that "the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."'1 36 The First Amendment, at its very core, safeguards
both political association and expression; 37 moreover, since the freedom to associate is closely related to freedom of speech, 38 it holds a
preferred position in the constitutional hierarchy. 139 Additionally, in
commenting on the intimate nexus between assembly and speech, the
Court emphasized the effectiveness of group association in presenting
controversial views, both public and personal. 40
The case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson'4 ' is illustrative of
the potential detrimental effects of governmental intrusion on the
right of free association. In Patterson, the state sought disclosure of
the membership lists of the NAACP's Alabama supporters. 14 2 After
133. Id. (citation omitted), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 1074.
134. See infra Part Il.
135. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
136. Id. at 233. Accord Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163 (1992) ("We have held that the
First Amendment protects an individual's right to join groups and associate with others holding
similar beliefs."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
137. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (noting that "political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment"); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ("The First Amendment protects political association as well as
political expression."); see also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) (identifying the right of
association as a "basic constitutional freedom").
138. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960).
139. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948). See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486 (iterating that
the right of association "lies at the foundation of a free society").
140. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
141. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
142. See id. at 451, 453.
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the organization refused to produce the lists, it was held in contempt
and later fined $100,000.143 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held that the state had failed to sufficiently justify its need
for disclosure when weighed against the right of the members "to pursue their lawful private interest privately and to associate freely with
44

others."1
The Court further highlighted the potential chilling effect that compelled disclosure could produce since it "may induce members to
withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure," including physical
threats, discharge from employment, and other economic
repercussions. 145
In addition, the Court voiced concern that the interference with an
individual's right to associate may inhibit the vigorous speech necessary to maintain America's republican form of government. 146 In this
regard, the Supreme Court eloquently stated: "If there is any fixed

star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.' 1 47 In other words, "the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to

believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
143. See id. at 453-54.
144. Id. at 466.
145. Id. at 462-63.
146. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that First Amendment protections express the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[Flreedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."). As the Court explained on another occasion:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion
[Ilt is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to
speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the
chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (citation omitted).
147. Bamette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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State. ' 14 8 It is from these wellsprings that section 552a(e)(7)'s prohibition on the collection and maintenance of First Amendment records
149
gets its strength.
E.

1.

Appellate Decisions Construing the Law Enforcement Activity
Exception of Section 552a(e)(7) Prior to Becker
Clarkson v. IRS

Various appellate courts have adopted different standards in construing subsection (e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exception. The
first major appellate decision to interpret the exception was Clarkson
50 The plaintiff
v. IRS.'
in Clarkson was a law school graduate' 51 who
was involved with a number of organizations that protested the federal tax system. 152 The plaintiff was the main speaker at a meeting
held in preparation of Tax Protest Day. 1 53 Two IRS agents, pretending to be insurance agents, attended the meeting and made notes of
the plaintiff's speech. 54 After learning the agents' true identity, the
plaintiff submitted FOIA and Privacy Act requests with respect to the
IRS' covert activity.15 5 After filing suit, the plaintiff learned that the
IRS was maintaining surveillance memoranda, news releases, and
newsletters regarding his activities; 56 however, such records were not
kept in a file under the plaintiff's name, but rather were retained in a
"Tax Protestor Project" file. 157
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that the plaintiff's political speech was clearly subject to the First
Amendment protections of the Act; 1 58 however, since the court record
failed to show either the purpose of the monitoring or the practice of
the IRS with respect to maintaining such speeches, the case was re159
manded to the district court for further consideration.
In its opinion, the court set forth the following standard for interpreting the law enforcement activity exception: "[W]e hold that to the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
678 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir. 1982).
See id. at 1371 n.3.
See id. at 1369.
See id. at 1369-70.
See id. at 1370, 1374.
See id. at 1370.
See Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1372.
See id. at 1373.
See id. at 1374.
See id. at 1375.
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extent that the IRS has engaged in the practice of collecting protected
information, unconnected to any investigation of past, present or anticipated violations of the statutes which it is authorized to enforce,
subsection (e)(7) of the Act has been violated.' 160 In addition, the
following language quoted with approval by the court' 61 clearly foreshadowed the issue at the heart of the conflict between the circuits
that is the subject of this Comment:
Merely because [an agency] may act within its authority by monitoring the public or private speeches of a person in the course of a
legitimate security investigation does not give it the right to maintain records relating to the contents of these speeches where the
does not focus on a past or anticipated specific crimiinvestigation
162
nal act.
63
Following remand, the appellate court, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's Privacy Act claim,
stating that the affidavits filed in support of the defendants' summary
judgment motion established that the documents at issue were "colmaintained in connection with legitimate law enforcement
lected and' ' 164

activities.

2. Jabara v. Webster
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision
66
in Jabara v. Webster,165 which followed shortly after Clarkson,
adopted a different standard for construing the law enforcement activity exception. 167 In Jabara, the plaintiff, a Detroit attorney, was an
active participant in Arab causes.' 68 The FBI investigated the plaintiff's activities for a period of eight years.' 69 According to the district
court, the methods utilized by the FBI included "physical surveillance
by informants and agents, inspection of Jabara's bank records, war160. Id.
161. See MacPherson v. IRS, 803 F.2d 479, 483 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting Clarkson's approval).
162. Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1374 (second emphasis added) (quoting Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.
Supp. 561, 581 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v.
Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982)).
163. Clarkson v. IRS, 811 F.2d 1396 (11th Cir. 1987).
164. Id. at 1397.
165. 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982).
166. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Jabara was issued exactly four months after the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Clarkson.

167. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
168. See Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 564 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982).
169. See id. The defendants claimed that after November 1971 the FBI had "cause to believe
that Jabara was a cadre member of a Middle East terrorist organization." Jabara, 691 F.2d at

279.
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rantless electronic surveillance by the FBI and [National Security
Agency], interviews of third parties regarding Jabara and the maintenance and dissemination of information gained during the investigation. 17v0 Summaries of the plaintiff's political speeches and
conversations at public and private functions were also retained. 171 In
addition, the FBI obtained information concerning the plaintiff from
Zionist sources. 172 Seventeen agencies and three foreign governments
were provided information about the plaintiff by the FBI. 173 In late
1975, the government ended its investigation.1 74
Although the FBI claimed that its tactics were justified by national
security interests, 175 the district court found no evidence whatsoever
in the record "linking the plaintiff to the commission or anticipated
commission of any specific crime.' ' 76 Based upon this finding, 177 the
district court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
with respect to liability on the Privacy Act claim.' 78 The district court
reasoned that subsection (e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exemption
was inapplicable to "records which do not relate to specific past, pre79
sent or future criminal acts.'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's grant of summary judgment on the Privacy Act issue for reconsideration under a different standard. 80 In this regard, the court held
that section 552a(e)(7) "allows investigation with respect to the exercise of first amendment rights if such investigation is relevant to an
authorized criminal investigation or to an authorized intelligence or
administrative one."' 18

170. Jabara,476 F. Supp. at 564.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 565.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 564.
176. Jabara,476 F. Supp. at 564.
177. The district judge also noted that he found "nothing in the Williamson affidavit to support a finding that the FBI investigation of Jabara was in response to any suspicion that he was
involved in any past specific crime or that he would commit any specific future crime." Id. at
581-82.
178. See id. at 582.
179. Id. at 581.
180. See Jabara, 691 F.2d at 280 ("[Tlhe district court's construction of the exemption in the
statute, limiting it to investigation of past, present or future criminal activity, is too narrow.").
181. Id. at 279-80. See Nagel v. HEW, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing the
Jabara standard with approval); see also Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 1990).
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3. MacPherson v. IRS
A third method of interpreting the law enforcement activity exception was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in MacPherson v. IRS.182 The plaintiff in MacPherson was an
attorney who specialized in criminal tax law. 183 As part of its monitoring of the "tax protester" movement, the IRS conducted surveillance
of certain individuals and groups. 184 IRS agents anonymously attended a number of conventions at which the plaintiff spoke, made
notes of the plaintiff's addresses, and bought tapes of his speeches. 185
The information was maintained in a "Tax Protest Project File," and
not in a file under the plaintiff's name. 186 The material was distributed to numerous IRS offices, the DOJ, and other parties. 18 7 In addition, the court pointed out that the plaintiff "[wals not suspected or
illegal conduct or of the
accused of any past, present, or anticipated
88
advocacy of illegal acts or violence.'
In MacPherson,the Ninth Circuit adopted an "individual, case-bycase basis" approach for considering the factors to be weighed under
subsection (e)(7) for and against the retention of records that describe
First Amendment exercise. 18 9 Although the court ruled that the maintenance of records in this particular case fell within the law enforcement activity exception, 90 the Ninth Circuit was very deliberate in
expressly narrowing its holding to the specific facts involved.' 9' The
court cautioned:
[W]e emphasize that we do not decide a number of similar but potentially distinguishable situations that may arise. For example, we
do not decide whether the records of MacPherson's speeches would
be "pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity" if the records were filed under his name rather than
in a general "tax protestor" file. Likewise we do not decide whether
182. 803 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1986). For an analysis critical of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
MacPherson, see Steven W. Jacobson, Casenote, MacPherson v. IRS: A Dilution of First
Amendment Rights in Favor of Expanded FederalAgency Law Enforcement Powers, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 795 (1987).

183. See id. at 797.
184. See MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 480.
185. See id. The tapes were later transcribed. Id.
186. See id. at 480, 485 n.9.
187. See id. at 480.
188. Id.
189. MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 484.
190. Some of the factors influencing the court's decision were: (1) the public nature of plaintiff's speeches; (2) the fact that these addresses were available for purchase; and (3) the lack of
indication that the records "were used or intended to be used for any other purpose than to give
a complete picture of the conference." Id. at 484-85.
191. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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records of the activities of other individuals at the conventions and
conferences who did not give public speeches and whose comments
were not recorded for sale would fall within the "law enforcement
activities" exception. Such cases might raise additional questions
1 92
about the "scope" of the law enforcement activity involved.
4.

Patterson v. FBI

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted
yet another standard under section 552a(e)(7) in the peculiar case 193
of Patterson v. FBL1 94 In Patterson,the plaintiff, a sixth-grade student
in elementary school, resolved to write a world encyclopedia as a
school project. 195 In order to obtain his information, the child wrote
to all of the world's 169 countries. 1 96 Due to the amount of foreign
correspondence the child received, the FBI opened an investigation
and visited the plaintiffs home unannounced. 1 97 As a result, the FBI
maintained at least one file' 98 (and possibly six files) 199 on the child.
Following the visit, consultation with the child's parents, and a telephone interview with the child himself, the FBI agent wrote a memorandum purportedly terminating the investigation;20 0 however, despite
the FBI's claims that it ceased its investigation, evidence surfaced that
192. MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 485 n.9. This footnote plays an important role in both of the
subject opinions. See infra Part IV.C.4.
193. See OFFICE OF INFORMATON AND PRIVACY, supra note 10, at 703 (noting that Patterson

"attracted national media attention because of its unusual factual background"). The district
court judge highlighted the bizarre nature of this case in his opinion: "The facts of this case
vividly illustrate the parental concern and public consternation which can be produced when the
apparently remote world of high-tech intelligence and counter-intelligence is applied to the everyday world of grade school and school projects in the name of national security." Patterson v.
FBI, 705 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (D.N.J. 1989), affd, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990).
194. 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990).
195. See id. at 597.
196. See Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1036.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 1036, 1044.
199. See id. at 1037; see also Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398, 408 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting potential
existence of six files maintained on child in Patterson).
200. See Patterson,705 F. Supp. at 1036-37. The district judge subtly expressed the ludicrousness of the entire situation in his description of the FBI agent's memorandum:
The memorandum contains a description of Todd's project and further states "Newark[,
New Jersey] indices as well as local criminal checks negative on subject" and "[i]n view
of the above, Newark contemplates no further investigation in this matter." The memorandum demonstrates that once the FBI learned the source of the international correspondence was not an entity called "Laboratory Disposable Products" [the name of a
business the child's parents ran out of their home] but was in reality a seventh grader
involved in a school project, the FBI wisely concluded that no espionage was being
committed.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:675

government monitoring continued. 20 1 The child's mail was received in
damaged condition, and the plaintiff, his parents, and others complained of hearing strange noises on the telephone. 20 2 After the child
initiated suit through his father, the FBI responded to his discovery
requests by formally claiming military and state secrets privilege
20 3
through an affidavit from the United States Attorney General.
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
FBI on the plaintiff's Privacy Act claim, 20 4 the Third Circuit adopted a
relevancy standard 20 5 in interpreting the law enforcement activity exception: "We, therefore, hold that a federal agency defending its
maintenance of records under Section (e)(7) must demonstrate that its
records on an individual's exercise of First Amendment rights are rel' 2 °6
evant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency.
The court concluded by stating that the maintenance of records in the
201. See id. at 1037.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1038; see also Patterson, 893 F.2d at 600.
204. In dismissing the child's Privacy Act claim, the district court went to great lengths to
temper a seemingly unjustifiable result:
In retrospect, it is clear that plaintiff violated no laws in the course of his correspondence project nor was involved in any clandestine activity, yet the FBI could not have
known this prior to undertaking some type of investigation. Such an investigation, and
any related records kept, would be justified as long as the FBI complied with the relevant statutes and undertook the investigation in the least intrusive means possible given
the circumstances. The Court finds the FBI's investigation and maintenance of records
on plaintiff does fit within statutory and regulatory limits. This finding may be of only
limited consolation to plaintiff, whose legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights
resulted in an FBI file. However, plaintiff can take satisfaction in the fact that his
resort to the judicial process has resulted in this Court conducting an independent examination of the FBI's conduct in accordance with the statutory standard as set out by
Congress in the Privacy Act. In the Privacy Act, Congress implicitly accepted that the
slight chill on free speech created by agency maintenance of records on First Amendment activity is necessary in light of the need for agencies to maintain adequate records
relevant to legitimate law enforcement activities. After reviewing the Greer Affidavit,
the Court finds that the FBI has acted properly in regard to records maintained about
plaintiff. However, the in camera inspection also allows this Court to assure plaintiff
that any records maintained by the FBI on him do not reflect negatively on his character or conduct. Accordingly, the Court can assure plaintiff that the law enforcement
activity conducted by the FBI in this case should not in any way inhibit him from pursuing any legitimate exercise of his First Amendment rights, including writing letters to
countries throughout the world. Furthermore, plaintiff's fear of an aborted or limited
public service career arising out of these events is misplaced.
Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1044-45.
205. See Patterson,893 F.2d at 603 ("In our view, a relevancy standard is more consistent with
Congress's intent and will prove to be a more manageable standard than employing one based
on ad-hoc review.").
206. Id.
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plaintiffs case met the requirement and that "[c]ontinued mainte7
nance" would not violate the Act.2 0
Apart from its factual uniqueness, the anomalous nature of Patterson is even more striking when one considers Patterson'suncanny similarity to a case cited by Senator Percy during the Senate debate for
the purpose of emphasizing the substantial protections the Act would
afford:
The kinds of exception that arose, that have given such great emphasis to this bill, are the kind of situation which a mail cover picks
up the fact that a high school girl-in this case, it was a girl by the
name of Lori Paton-wrote a letter in connection with a high school
theme to an agency that happened to be on the FBI's subversive list.
The mail surveillance picked up that she was corresponding with
such an agency, and she was therefore named in the record, and a
high school girl had an FBI record.
All she was doing was writing a high school theme. She was not a
subversive, but there she was, she had a file with the FBI. The family literally had to go to court and sue the Government in order to
have that record taken out, along with all the other people that
might be in such a position.
Our bill is so carefully
drafted, that it would permit her to obtain
20 9
access

5.

20 8

to her file.

Wabun-Inini v. Sessions

Finally, in Wabun-Inini v. Sessions,210 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit briefly addressed the law enforcement
activity exception but failed to define a specific standard for interpreting subsection (e)(7). 2 11 In Wabun-Inini, the plaintiff dropped off two
rolls of color film at a one-hour photo shop to be processed. 212 After
he left the store, an FBI agent entered the establishment and requested a set of prints from the plaintiffs negatives, which the store
manager allowed the agent to purchase. 213 After the plaintiff was in207. Id.
208. A right, incidentally, that the child in Patterson was denied. See Patterson,705 F. Supp. at
1044-45.
209. 120 CONG. REc. 36,907 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Percy), reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra

note 34, at 811.
210. 900 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1990).
211. See id. at 1245-46.
212. See id. at 1236.
213. See id. The Eighth Circuit never discussed why the FBI was interested in viewing the
plaintiff's negatives. The only clue to the FBI's motivation can be gleaned from the plaintiff's
argument on appeal that his Fourth Amendment claim should have been considered under
heightened scrutiny because his First Amendment associational rights were implicated in the
warrantless search and seizure of his photographs. See id. at 1240. Based upon this contention,
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formed of the FBI's activities by store employees, he filed suit seeking
214
declaratory and injunctive relief.
In a cursory treatment of the Privacy Act issue, the Eighth Circuit
held that the FBI's conduct fell within the law enforcement activity
exception because the district court found that the FBI had probable
cause to seize the pictures. 215 The court did not adopt a specific standard of interpretation and stated that it preferred "to delay a closer
scrutiny of the law enforcement exemption until the issue is more
2' 16
carefully framed and necessary to the decision.

III.

SUBJECT OPINIONS

Presently, there is a direct conflict between the circuits regarding
the propriety of the government's maintenance of First Amendment
records under the Privacy Act. This controversy is expressed in the
divergent interpretations of section 552a(e)(7)2 17 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Becker v. IRS2 18 and the
District of Columbia Circuit in J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation v.
FBI.2 19 Both decisions must be detailed in full, especially Judge
220
Tatel's dissent in MacArthur Foundation.
A.
1.

Becker v. IRS

District Court Opinion

In Becker v. IRS,221 the district court addressed the Privacy Act
question on a motion for summary judgment filed by the IRS. 222 The

plaintiffs, three brothers, opposed the motion on the ground that the
it appears that the FBI may have been attempting to learn the identity of individuals with whom
the plaintiff was connected.
214. See id. at 1237. With respect to the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim, the court ruled
that plaintiff's expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable because, under the narrow
factual circumstances present, the particular photo processing equipment used by the store exposed the photographs to public view during development. See Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1243.
215. See id. at 1246. Because the FBI made an ex parte, in camera submission to the district
court, the basis upon which the FBI established probable cause to seize the plaintiff's photographs was never revealed. See id. at 1246-47.
216. See id., at 1246.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994).
218. 34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1994).
219. 102 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
220. See id. at 607-09 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
221. Nos. 91 C 1203-91 C 1205, 1993 WL 114612 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 13, 1993), rev'd, 34 F.3d 398
(7th Cir. 1994).
222. See id. at *1.
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IRS had unlawfully collected and maintained First Amendment
records in violation of section 552a(e)(7). 223
In Becker, the IRS maintained individual tax files on three brothers
under the agency's "Illegal Tax Protestor Program. '224 The files were
apparently generated 22 5 as a result of information obtained in an illegal search conducted by the IRS in April of 1985226 against the National Commodity and Barter Association (NCBA), a First
Amendment organization. 227 The brothers' files contained a collection of newspaper articles concerning various citizens who were al223. See id.
224. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 401 nn.4-7.
225. The court of appeals noted that the brothers' files were apparently opened because of a
referral that was prompted by the brothers' association with the "National Commodity Exchange Association." See id. at 401 nn.4, 6. The correct name of the organization is the "National Commodity and Barter Association;" however, the court mistakenly combined the names
of the "National Commodity and Barter Association" and the "National Commodity Exchange," the former's service wing. See infra note 227.
226. The IRS' April 5, 1985 raid on the NCBA's headquarters was held to be an illegal search
in Voss v. Bergsgaard. 774 F.2d 402, 404-06 (10th Cir. 1985). See 1 DARRELL MCGOWEN ET AL.,
CRIMUNAL TAX FRAUD § 2.4 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997) (describing raid on NCBA as part of the
IRS' General Enforcement Program and noting that "the IRS did not exhibit timidity" in seeking out those it branded as 'illegal tax protestors"'). In affirming the district court's finding
that the warrants constituted illegal writs of assistance, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the warrants
were invalid on particularity grounds: "The warrants allowed precisely the kind of rummaging
through a person's belongings, in search of evidence of even previously unsuspected crimes or of
no crime at all, that the [F]ourth [A]mendment proscribes." Voss, 774 F.2d at 405. The court of
appeals further pointed out that "[t]he warrants' overbreadth [was] made even more egregious
by the fact that the search at issue implicated free speech and associational rights .... The search
warrant authorized the seizure of indicia of membership in or association with the NCBA as well
as books expressing its particular political ideology." Id. The court also noted: "Certainly, the
organization's advocation of modifying or abolishing our country's tax system is a legitimate
activity. Indeed, it is an activity protected by the first amendment." Id. at 406. Cf National
Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the
NCBA's right to bring Bivens action against the IRS agents for First and Fourth Amendment
violations because "certain values, such as those protected by the [Flirst and [F]ourth amendments, may be superior to the need to protect the integrity of the internal revenue system").
In addition, while addressing the issue in a FOIA, rather than a Privacy Act, context, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the brothers' assertion that their files were generated from the
IRS' April 1985 raid on the NCBA. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 407; see also Brief for Appellants at
12, Becker (No. 93-2475) (document released by IRS indicated April 1985 date for creation of
file on plaintiff); id. & App. 27-29 (document released regarding each brother stated "Source
N.C.B.A.").
227. The NCBA is "a noncommercial, nonprofit, voluntary political and educational association of individuals who believe in abolition of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Expression
of the association's political, social and educational values takes the form of sponsoring seminars
and other educational activities and the distribution of literature." National Commodity and
Barter Ass'n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521, 1525 (10th Cir. 1994). The National Commodity Exchange
is "a service wing of the association, available exclusively to its members, some of whom use its
services to obtain gold and silver .... " Id.
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leged to be tax protesters 228 and a flyer advertising a book by John
Grandbouche, "a long-time IRS foe."' 229 None of the documents
named or referred to the brothers. 230 The files on the brothers were
closed in April of 1991.231
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Judge James Alesia, held that while none of
the documents at issue described directly how the brothers exercised
their First Amendment rights, 232 the maintenance of the records in the
brothers' files unquestionably implied that they associated with tax
protesters and cheats;2 33 therefore, the district judge concluded that
such maintenance did, in fact, describe how the brothers exercised
2 34
their speech and associational rights.
The IRS claimed that the information, nevertheless, fell within the
law enforcement activity exception and was exempt from disclosure
pursuant to section 552a(k)(2) of the Act, 235 which permits the head
of an agency to exempt certain "investigatory material compiled for
law enforcement purposes. 2 3 6 With respect to subsection (e)(7), the
district court stated that due to the brothers' association with the
NCBA, as evidenced by the documents, and the continuous litigation
between the NCBA and the IRS, the IRS had a right to conduct an
investigation of the brothers.2 37 Moreover, the court ruled that "the
need of the IRS for effective law enforcement outweighs any interest
the plaintiffs have in receiving these documents. '238 The court thus
concluded that the material could be lawfully maintained by the
IRS. 239 The district court judge further held that the documents were
exempt under subsection (k)(2). 240 Accordingly, the court granted the
IRS' motion for summary judgment on the brothers' Privacy Act
claims.24 1
228. See Becker, 1993 WL 114612, at *2 ("Each document ...is a newspaper account of a raid
or lawsuit by the IRS against a non-tax payer.").
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 401.
232. See Becker, 1993 WL 114612, at *2.
233. See id. On the book advertisement was the notation "'Associate with Grandbauche [sic]
case"' was above the words "'National Commodity Barter Association,"' and was apparently
added by an IRS employee. Id.
234. See id.
235. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (1994).
236. Id.
237. See Becker, 1993 WL 114612, at *3.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
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Seventh Circuit Decision

In Becker, the Seventh Circuit addressed a question of first impression under the Privacy Act,242 namely, whether section 552a(e)(7) permitted a government agency to maintain records in a citizen's
individual file that described how that citizen exercised his or her First
Amendment rights when the records were no longer pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.
A unanimous three-judge panel, consisting of Chief Judge Richard
A. Posner, Judge Thomas E. Fairchild, and Judge Joel M. Flaum, reversed the district court's Privacy Act holding in its entirety.2 43 Initially, with respect to the lower court's ruling on section 552a(k)(2),
the Seventh Circuit noted that the court's application of this exemption was inappropriate concerning the maintenance of files, as opposed to access to files, 244 because subsection (k) did not grant an
exemption from section 552a(e)(7). 2 45 After illustrating that the documents at issue "were published, do not relate to the Beckers, and are
contained in files which were closed in April 1991," '246 the court examined the numerous standards applied by the circuits in defining the
law enforcement activity exception to subsection (e)(7). 2 47
On appeal, the brothers contended that the maintenance of prejudicial records in their personal tax files was nothing more than an attempt by the IRS to brand them as illegal tax protesters by means of
guilt-by-association.2 48 The brothers argued that such record keeping,
under the guise of section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exception, was impermissible because it constituted a violation of the
protections afforded by the First Amendment: 249
[Tihe gratuitous filing of records concerning the activities of others
in plaintiffs' files has the immediate and chilling effect of "red-flagging" the plaintiffs as potential tax evaders for the remainder of
their lives, despite the fact that plaintiffs have never violated the tax
242. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
243. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 409.
244. During oral argument, Chief Judge Posner made the following observation in this regard:
"The issue under the Privacy Act is not whether [the plaintiffs] can see [the documents], but
whether [the IRS] can keep them .... Under the Privacy Act, you're not trying to conceal
something from them, you're simply trying to retain things in files." Audio tape of Oral Argument, supra note 8.
245. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 408. Section 552a(k) only permits the head of an agency to exempt
a system of records from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f) of
the Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (1994).
246. Becker, 34 F.3d at 408.
247. See id. at 408-09.
248. See Brief for Appellants at 36, Becker (No. 93-2475).
249. See id. at 36, 38-39.
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laws. Thus, as a result of the maintenance of such records in their
files, plaintiffs must be wary of any future associations and public
250
declarations of belief for fear of future reprisals from the IRS.
During oral argument, an exchange took place between the panel
and the DOJ attorney, Murray Horwitz, regarding the maintenance of
First Amendment records under subsection (e)(7). This exchange revealed the unique nature of the dispute in Becker, as well as the government's previously unarticulated position concerning its right to
retain such protected material. The following is an excerpt of the relevant portions of the exchange:
CHIEF JUDGE POSNER: Isn't it the section about maintain no
record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity?
MR. HORWITZ: Right, and at the time of the investigation it
was pertinent thereto.
CHIEF JUDGE POSNER: But what about after the investigation ends?
MR. HORWITZ: Well, um, that has never really come up. And I
think what you can say there is that it might be pertinent in the
future if someone says, "Well, we ought to investigate the Beckers
because of an association with NCBA," and rather than reinventing
the wheel, if they go to a file and see that it's been closed because of
that, that's the end of it.
JUDGE FLAUM: But Mr. Horwitz, could that be maintained in
an investigatory file, in other words, I appreciate the argument
you're making about a potential future investigation, but should
that be maintained in the Privacy file?
MR. HORWITZ: If the investigation was initially started and it
was correct, then yes, it can be maintained under that.
JUDGE FLAUM: Is the government's position that if a newspaper, for example, let's say, a newspaper item carried the potential
for the reader to interpret that a third party would be involved even
though it's a document you took out of the public domain, but you
would say that risk of exposure by announcing you had that particular .

.

. copy of the paper would justify really permanent mainte-

nance with that document?
MR. HORWITZ: Well, we don't know whether it came out from
another investigation file or whether it was just a clipping that
someone just happened to clip and stick in because ...
JUDGE FLAUM: Well, under that broad an interpretation then
you would probably never purge under the Privacy Act, would you?
I am trying to be responsible in the approach, but I'm just trying to
see what's the end game here, whether there is a way, is there ever a
way when one would go in and purge?
250. Id. at 37.
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MR. HORWITZ: There are times where the IRS goes in, they
have a cycle where they go through and if it's no longer, in their
view, relevant or pertinent it can be taken out but ...

except for

that, I don't have an answer for you.
CHIEF JUDGE POSNER: But is it your view that the term "pertinent" in this subsection (e)(7)-that once pertinent, always pertinent, is that the argument? That if they had an investigatory
purpose initially and that's how these articles got into the file that
there is no legal duty ever to discard the documents?
MR. HORWITZ: That would be our position. [I]f it was pertinent in the beginning...
CHIEF JUDGE POSNER: Has that ever been addressed?
MR. HORWITZ: Not that I know of.
CHIEF JUDGE POSNER: Because you could easily read, it says
"maintain," it doesn't say "create," it says "maintain a record unless
pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity," and you could argue that to retaina record after the investigatory purpose has lapsed is not to maintain a record that is within
the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

MR. HORWITZ: I think what the court normally does is look at
the time that the documents were acquired to determine whether or
not there was a law enforcement investigation or some form of an
investigation.
CHIEF JUDGE POSNER: So there's no concept of staleness?
MR. HORWITZ: As to how long can these documents be maintained, there's a tremendous debate going on as to how long they
really can be maintained. One view, just in general, is that if they're
investigation files they can be maintained forever. Others, that after twenty or thirty or forty years they should be able to be released.
251
I do not have an answer for you on that.

In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the IRS had failed
to meet its burden of justifying the maintenance of such records in the
brothers' files: "We have examined the material, and any thought that
it could be helpful in future enforcement activity concerning the Beckers is untenable. '25 2 In so holding, the court rejected the IRS' claim
that maintenance of the articles was justified "for possible future
uses.

' 253

To further rebut the IRS' claim, the court emphasized the

First Amendment nature of the records involved 254 and cited to legislative history that emphasized the statute's prohibition on the mainte251. Audio tape of Oral Argument, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
252. Becker, 34 F.3d at 409. ("The material consists of newspaper articles dating from the
middle to late 1980s, with no reference to the Beckers; any potential advantage to having these
documents in the Beckers' files, at some uncertain date, is minuscule (and the IRS does not
elaborate on how this material would be helpful).").
253. Id.
254. See id. ("This indefinite [future] use must be viewed in light of the fact that Judge Alesia
found that the Beckers' First Amendment rights [weire implicated.").
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nance of "protected information not immediately needed, about lawabiding Americans, on the off-chance that Government . . . might
'2 55
possibly have to deal with them in the future.
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished its ruling from the holding in
MacPherson v. IRS 256 because the records in Becker were contained
in individual tax files, rather than in a general file as in MacPherson.2 57 The court then ordered that the offending documents be
expunged. 258
B.

J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation v. FBI

1. District Court Opinion
Similar to the court in Becker,259 the district court in J.Roderick
MacArthur Foundation v. FB126° decided the individual plaintiffs Privacy Act claim on a summary judgment motion. The plaintiff was the
president of a foundation that gave grants to groups concerned with
social, political, and economic issues. 26 1 In that capacity, the president
met political dissidents and leaders from foreign countries. 262 Due to
263
the president's associations, the FBI began to monitor his contacts.
The FBI maintained a file under the president's name; moreover, certain documents contained in the file referred to the president's "associational activities. ' ' 264 After the FBI released only redacted copies of
some of the documents, the president and the foundation sued, inter
alia, to enjoin the FBI from maintaining such records in the presi265
dent's file and sought an order expunging said documents.
In a cursory, one-page order, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that
"the documents were compiled for legitimate law enforcement purposes; and that the investigation(s) referred to therein were not of the
plaintiffs, but of others with whom plaintiffs came into incidental
255. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 57 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916,

6971).
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

803 F.2d 479, 480, 485 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Becker, 34 F.3d at 409; see also supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See Becker, 34 F.3d at 409.
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
No. 90 CV 2906 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 27, 1990).
See J.Roderick MacArthur Found. v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 601-02.
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(and, to appearances, innocent) contact ....
",266 Accordingly, the disjudgment.2 67
summary
for
motion
FBI's
the
granted
court
trict
2.

Decision of District of Columbia Circuit

In J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation v. FBI,268 a two-to-one decision, the District of Columbia Circuit2 69 explicitly criticized the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Becker2 70 and, in so doing, created a direct
conflict between the circuits with respect to the proper interpretation
of section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exception.
a. Majority Decision
The issue, as framed by the District of Columbia Circuit, was virtually identical to that facing the court in Becker. The court considered
whether an agency may continue to retain records describing an individual's First Amendment rights when, although the records were initially collected for a lawful purpose, the records are no longer
pertinent to and within the scope of a current law enforcement activity
27 1
with respect to the individual.
Initially, the majority noted the "great stress" that the foundation's
2 72
president placed upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Becker.
However, after asserting that the Becker opinion did not "quite reach
the issue before us, ' 27 3 the majority questioned how the records in the
files in Becker could qualify as records describing the brothers' First
Amendment activities, considering the fact that the documents did not
relate to the brothers. 274 The majority next stated that "the [Becker]
'27 5
court's analysis of § (e)(7) ...[wa]s neither clear nor compelling.
266. Order at 1, MacArthur Found., No. 90 CV 2906 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 1995) (granting summary judgment).
267. See id.
268. 102 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
269. The majority decision was written by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, in which Judge A. Raymond Randolph joined.
270. See infra notes 272-276 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.
271. In the words of the majority:
More specifically, [plaintiff] claims that "information which may have been properly
collected as part of a legitimate law enforcement investigation may not be permanently
kept under the name of the individual, especially when that individual is not the target
of the investigation .... Lindblom's primary assertion, that the Act forbids maintenance of information about first amendment activities unless that information serves a
"current law enforcement necessity," requires more extended analysis.
MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 602.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 603.
275. Id.
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Specifically, the majority took issue with the terminology used by the
Seventh Circuit, asserted that the latter court confused sections
276
552a(e)(7) and (k)(2), and discussed the expungement issue.
The majority then set forth its interpretation of the language of section 552a(e)(7). The majority read the phrase "pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity" as modifying only the word "record," rather than the phrase "maintain no
record. ' 277 Specifically, the majority stated:
Nor do we think that the provision, as written, can be read to require that the maintenance of a record, as opposed to the record
itself, must be pertinent to an authorized law enforcement activity.
One might argue that the Congress meant to say that an agency may
"maintain no record relating to first amendment activities unless doing so would be pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized
law enforcement activity." But the Congress did not say that .... 278
While the majority conceded that an alternative interpretation was
possible, it remarked that it was unaware of a reason to believe that
Congress meant to say something other than what was stated in the
Act.

27 9

Due to its statutory interpretation, the majority also dismissed as
"trivial" the president's argument that "information must be pertinent
to a law enforcement activity not only when the agency collects the
material but for as long as the agency maintains . . . the information. '" 28° The majority likewise rejected the president's reliance upon
the oft-quoted language from the Senate Report forbidding the collection of records on the off-chance that the government might have to
deal with the individual in the future, 281 noting that the Report concerned a preliminary draft proposal different from the current statu282
tory provision.
In addition, the majority advanced three policy arguments in opposition to the view that expungement was required when records being
retained were no longer pertinent to and within the scope of an au276. See id.
277. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603 ("The noun 'record' in § (e)(7) is modified in only
two ways: the record must be '[11 pertinent to and [2] within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity.'").
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. Id. See id. ("Lindblom tries to bolster his narrow interpretation of § (e)(7) by noting that
the Act defines 'maintain' to include 'collect, maintain, use [and] disseminate,' but substituting
any or all of those verbs in § (e)(7) does nothing to change what the adjective 'pertinent' modi-

fies."). The plaintiff's argument is based upon the definition of "maintain" as set forth in subsection (a)(3). See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(3) (1994).
281. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
282. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603-04.
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thorized law enforcement activity: (1) law enforcement agencies
would be oppressed with "new and daunting burdens; ' 283 (2) federal
agencies would be inundated with requestors seeking to purge their
files; 284 and (3) expungement of records in dormant files would not
"contribute appreciably to individual privacy. ' 285
The majority then distinguished the president's case from both
Becker and MacPherson,labeling language in both of the previous decisions as "dicta" 286 and remarked that neither case stood for the proposition "that an agency may not maintain records relating to an
individual under that individual's name. '287
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
FBI on the president's Privacy Act claim, the majority concluded:
Accordingly, we hold that the Privacy Act does not prohibit an
agency from maintaining records about an individual's first amendment activities if the information was pertinent to an authorized law
enforcement activity when the agency collected the information.
The Act does not require an agency to expunge records when they
are no longer pertinent to a current law enforcement activity.2 88
b.

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tatel

Circuit Judge David Tatel rejected the majority's interpretation of
subsection (e)(7), 28 9 explicating the provision's language as follows:
The statute [5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(3)] defines "maintain" as including both "maintain" and "collect." To collect means "to gather together." To maintain means "to keep in existence or continuance;
preserve." In order to give each of these verbs its meaning, I would
283. Id. at 604. See infra Part IV.C.3.b.
284. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 604; infra Part IV.C.3.a.
285. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 605. See infra Part IV.C.3.c.
286. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 605.
Lindblom particularly objects to the FBI's maintenance of the relevant records in a file
retrievable by his name. Lindblom points to dicta in two cases suggesting that whether
information is kept in an individual's file or in a general subject file may be a factor to
consider in determining whether the agency must expunge a record.
Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 607 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
The court's observation that the word "pertinent" modifies only the noun "record" and
its assumption that "law enforcement activity" includes activities ended long ago, lead
it to conclude that the FBI may, consistent with section (e)(7), inventory information
on the First Amendment activities of citizens for which the agency has no present, articulable use. Because I believe the court's parsing of section (e)(7)'s language does
not result in the best interpretation of that provision as a whole, I respectfully dissent
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interpret section (e)(7), as a whole, to require that records be pertinent to "an authorized law enforcement activity"-words undefined

in the statute-not only at the time of gathering, i.e., collecting, but
also at the time of keeping, i.e., maintaining. In other words, if
there is no current law enforcement activity to which a record has
pertinence, the agency may not maintain it. Not only does this ap-

proach avoid effectively reading the word "maintain" out of that
term's statutory definition, but it furthers the Act's purpose to pro-

and retention of pertect citizens from the unnecessary collection
29
government.
the
by
information
sonal

Judge Tatel set forth several examples of language that Congress
could have chosen, but did not, that would have supported the majority's interpretation of section 552a(e)(7). 2 91 In this regard, Judge Tatel

stated that if the statute simply provided that an agency shall "collect
no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed
by the First amendment... unless pertinent to and within the scope of

an authorized law enforcement activity," he would agree that information does not need to be of enduring pertinence in order for it to be
retained.2 92 However, since Congress instead utilized the word "maintain," and defined it as meaning both "maintain" and "collect" in sub-

"Congress must have
section (a)(3), Judge Tatel determined that
293
meant something more than just 'collect.'"
Judge Tatel further illustrated that the Act's legislative history indicated just as strong a concern over the maintenance of First Amendment records as their initial collection.2 94 In addition, he noted that in
debating the law enforcement activity exception, members of the
290. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 607 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
291. See id. at 607-08.
292. See id. at 607 (emphasis in original).
293. Id. at 608. The other hypothetical language offered by Judge Tatel by way of illustration
was that agencies were prohibited from maintaining First Amendment records "compiled for,
and within the scope of, an authorized law enforcement activity." Id. at 607 (emphasis in original). The phrase "compiled for" is employed in 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(j)(2), 552a(k)(2), and
552a(k)(5) (1994) (the latter subsection uses the phrase "compiled solely for"). Id. at 607-08.
294. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 608 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Tatel
stated:
Although Congress was clearly concerned about illegitimate collection of information
regarding First Amendment activities, nothing in the legislative history indicates that
Congress was not equally concerned, as the language of section (e)(7) indicates, with
the maintenance of documents no longer pertinent to law enforcement activities. Indeed, the legislative history of the Privacy Act reveals congressional concern with both
collection and retention of material. In describing the Act's purposes, the Senate Report recognizes collecting and maintaining files as separate activities, both deserving of
careful scrutiny ....
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House discussed only "maintenance. 2 95 Judge Tatel concluded by citing Congress' concern over governmental secrecy and "Big Brother"
surveillance, and stated that "[t]he fewer unnecessary files describing
First Amendment activities the government keeps on law-abiding citizens, the lesser the chance of any future abuse of those files. ' 296 The
president's certioraripetition was denied by the Supreme Court on

October 14,

1997.297

IV.

ANALYSIS

An examination of the conflict between the circuits reveals that the
opposing legal constructions of section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement
activity exception are, at their core, predicated upon antithetical political philosophies regarding the proper role of government vis-d-vis the
constitutionally protected activities of the American citizenry.
A.

Conflict Between the Circuits

The holding in Becker and Judge Tatel's dissent in MacArthur Foundation present a pro-privacy interpretation of the Act's law enforcement activity exception, whereas the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in MacArthur Foundation illustrates a pro-law enforcement
rendering of section 552a(e)(7). 2 98 Either the exception covers the
"maintenance," as well as the collection, of First Amendment records
as contended by the former authorities, or it restricts only the initial
"collection" of these records as asserted by the latter.299
295. See id. ("House members discussed only the 'maintenance' of records; they did not even
refer to collection." (citing 120 CONG. REC. 36,957 (1974))).
296. Id. at 608.
297. See id. at 600, cert. denied sub nom. Lindblom v. FBI, 522 U.S. 913 (1997).
298. At its core, this critical legal debate represents a clash of antithetical ideologies. In this
regard, the majority's decision in MacArthur Foundation represents a bold attempt to implement
the DOJ's litigation agenda-a policy designed to continuously expand the powers of federal law
enforcement agencies while quietly eroding the privacy rights of American citizens until the
latter protections are permanently lost in a morass of piecemeal judicial pronouncements. See
infra Part IV.B. In fact, the District of Columbia Circuit majority apparently adopted previously
rejected arguments wholesale from the DOJ's unsuccessful rehearing petition in Becker. Compare J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1996), with Internal
Revenue Service's Petition for Rehearing at 10-12, Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1994)
(No. 93-2475).
It is by no means an exaggeration to state that acceptance of the majority's interpretation of
the law enforcement activity exception would, for all practical purposes, sound the death knell
for any meaningful privacy protections still remaining under subsection (e)(7). See infra Part
V.A.
299. This dilemma cannot be meaningfully resolved without a thorough analysis of the Ichord
Amendment, an inquiry that no appellate court has yet to undertake. See infra note 395 and
accompanying text.
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The MacArthur Foundation Majority Criticism of Becker

Although the MacArthur Foundation majority asserted that "the
[Becker] court's analysis of § (e)(7)... [wa]s neither clear nor compelling, '300 it did not overtly challenge the Seventh Circuit's principal
holding, namely, that pursuant to subsection (e)(7), the IRS could not
legally continue to retain the records at issue, even though the initial
collection of the documents might have been permissible. Rather, the
majority addressed concerns in Becker that were not at issue before
the Seventh Circuit and criticized the terminology employed in the
301
latter's opinion.
For example, the majority questioned how the Becker documents in
the brothers' files could qualify as records depicting the brothers' constitutionally protected activities: "[I]f the articles did not relate to the
appellants, we do not understand how the articles could qualify for
expungement under § (e)(7) as records 'describing how [the appellants] exercise[ ] rights guaranteed by the First Amendment."' 30 2 The
First Amendment issue, however, was not before the Seventh Circuit
because the IRS did not challenge the district judge's conclusion in
30 3
this respect on appeal.

Nonetheless, Judge Alesia correctly decided 30 4 that placement of
the prejudicial records in the brothers' files ipso facto implied that the
brothers were associated with, or had the same beliefs as, the "tax
protesters" named in the articles and the flyer. 30 5 If the right of association was not implicated in such a situation, it would render the
guarantee meaningless by allowing government agents to permanently
brand innocent citizens by simply dropping inflammatory documents,
unrelated to that particular citizen, into his or her individual file, a
pernicious practice graphically exposed in Becker.
The majority also claimed that the court in Becker confused subsections (e)(7) and (k)(2). 30 6 In Becker, the IRS raised two separate issues under the Act: (1) an exemption claim under subsection
300. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 408 ("We accept Judge Alesia's conclusion regarding First Amendment rights for present purposes, because the IRS does not challenge this holding on appeal.").
304. Cf. supra notes 134-149 and accompanying text.
305. See Becker v. IRS, Nos. 91 C 1203 to 1205, 1993 WL 114612, at *2 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 13,
1993) (maintaining that the records in the plaintiffs' file describe how the plaintiffs exercised
their First Amendment rights of speech and association), rev'd on other grounds, 34 F.3d 398
(7th Cir. 1994).
306. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603.
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(k)(2); 30 7 and (2) the law enforcement activity exception to subsection
(e)(7).

In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit first addressed the IRS' claim

under section 552a(k)(2). 30 8 The court rejected this claim on the
ground that subsection (k)(2) does not provide an exemption from
subsection (e)(7). 30 9 In this regard, section 552a(k) only permits the

head of an agency to exempt a system of records from subsections
(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f). 310 In other
words, the Act does not allow the head of an agency to exempt a par-

ticular system of records from the special protections afforded by subsection (e)(7) regarding the collection and maintenance of First
Amendment records. 311
In rendering its decision on subsection (k)(2), the Seventh Circuit
also noted that "we need not rule on whether the IRS may prevent
access to the documents pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 1.36(b)(1), 312 because
the Beckers informed us at oral argument that their main objective

[wa]s to have the records removed from their files. '313 This articulated differentiation between disclosure (pursuant to section 552a(k))
and expungement (pursuant to section 552a(e)(7)) indicated that the
court was well informed as to the separate inquiries required under
these respective subsections. In addition, the court did not begin its
separate analysis of subsection (e)(7) until after it had disposed of the
IRS' claim under subsection (k)(2).

With respect to the Becker court's subsequent examination of subsection (e)(7), the Seventh Circuit did, on one occasion, refer generally to the "'law enforcement purposes' phrase of § 552(e)(7)," 314
307. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (1994).
308. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 408 ("Under § 552a(k), an agency head may promulgate rules to
exempt certain systems of records from the provisions of the Privacy Act which require that an
agency give an individual access to his or her file .....
309. See id.
310. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
311. See id.
312. 31 C.F.R. § 1.36(b)(1) (1999) (entitled "The Internal Revenue Service: Notice of Exempt
Systems").
313. Becker, 34 F.3d at 408.
314. Id. Section 552a(k)(2) employs the phrase "law enforcement purposes," whereas subsection (e)(7) uses the phrase "authorized law enforcement activity." Compare 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(k)(2) (1994), with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994). In essence, the MacArthur Foundation
majority seized upon this hyper-technical flaw in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in order to construct a strawman in an attempt to undermine the integrity of the holding in Becker. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603. Based upon this lone oversight in the drafting of the Seventh
Circuit's decision, the majority rather disingenuously opined that
the court's analysis of § (e)(7) in Becker is neither clear nor compelling. The court set
out to determine the meaning "of the 'law enforcement purposes' phrase of
§ 552a(e)(7)" not realizing that the phrase used in the Privacy Act is "authorized law
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rather than directly quote the precise statutory language, "authorized
law enforcement activity. '315 It is evident, however, from both the
lengthy citation of cases that followed this notation, 316 as well as from

the preceding portion of the court's Privacy Act opinion in which the
Seventh Circuit quoted the exception's statutory language verbatim, 317 that there was no confusion in the court's mind as to the differ3 18
ence between sections 552a(e)(7) and (k)(2).
Finally, the majority in MacArthur Foundation complained about

the Seventh Circuit's use of expungement as a remedy for subsection
(e)(7) violations: "A record disclosed pursuant to the Privacy Act or

the FOIA is not thereby made unavailable for use in future law enforcement activities. A record expunged pursuant to the Privacy Act,
on the other hand, is a record gone forever.

ever, is a well-recognized
552a(e)(7). 320
enforcement activity."

' 319

Expungement, how-

remedy for violations

of section

The court appears to have confused § 552a(e)(7)

with

§ 552a(k)(2) ....

Id.
315. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7).
316. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 408-09.
317. See id. at 407, 408.
318. The majority also made reference to the Seventh Circuit's citation of Voelker v. IRS, in
suggesting that the court in Becker "confused the statutory standard" with respect to disclosure
versus expungement. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit, however, neither cited Voelker in the main text of its opinion, nor did the court rely upon
Voelker in ordering expungement. See Becker, 34 F.3d at 409 n.27. Instead, the Seventh Circuit
panel referred to Voelker in a footnote with reference to the unique factual situation at issue in
Becker, namely, that the newspaper articles contained in the brothers' individual files made "no
reference to the Beckers." Id. at 409. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit in Voelker declared:
[I]t defies logic to say that information properly contained in a person's record does not
pertain to that person, even if it may also pertain to another individual. Accordingly,
we hold that a federal agency does not have discretion to withhold information contained in a requesting individual's record on the ground that the information does not
pertain to that individual.
Voelker, 646 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1981).
319. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603. In fact, the majority concluded its holding regarding
the president's claim under subsection (e)(7) by ruling that "[t]he Act does not require an
agency to expunge records when they are no longer pertinent to a current law enforcement
activity." Id. at 605.
320. See, e.g., Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[A] court may order ex); Hobson v. Wilpungement of records in an action brought under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) ....
son, 737 F.2d 1, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[I]t is now well-established that an order for expungement
of records is, in proper circumstances, a permissible remedy for an agency's violation of the
Privacy Act."); Nagel v. HEW, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The appropriate relief for
violations of Section (e)(7) includes damages as well as amendment or expungement of unlawful
records."); Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[E]ven if the analysts
are not entitled to damages, they may nevertheless be awarded some other remedy, such as
destruction of the videotape."); Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1375-77 (11th Cir. 1982) (approving expungement as proper remedy for violation of section 552a(e)(7)).
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This form of injunctive relief in the context of the law enforcement
activity exception was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit in Clarkson v.
IRS:
We find unpersuasive the government's argument that the Act
provides no effective relief for a violation of subsection (e)(7) ....
[W]e find it both necessary and appropriate to construe the plain
meaning of the language of subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) 32 1 to authorize the amendment or expungement of all records which are
maintained in violation of subsection (e)(7). Moreover, we believe
that this construction is consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting provisions to safeguard First Amendment rights. Just as Congress must have been aware of the special treatment accorded First
Amendment rights by the judiciary, it must also be credited with an
awareness of the typical remedies afforded to vindicate violations of
those rights. Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act, courts have
often recognized actions arising under the Constitution for expungement of agency records collected and maintained in violation
of the First Amendment. Thus, we hold that, at least with respect to
violations of subsection (e)(7), a plaintiff may be entitled to have
the offending records amended or expunged even if the records are
322
not maintained within the agency's system of records.
Some courts, nonetheless, have refused to permit injunctive relief for
violations of the Act when such remedy was not specifically
323
enumerated.
321. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2) and (3) (1994). These subsections provide, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(d) Access to records-Each agency that maintains a system of records shall(2) permit the individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him and(B) promptly, either(i) make any correction of any portion thereof which the individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete; or
(ii) inform the individual of its refusal to amend the record in accordance
with his request, the reason for the refusal, the procedures established
by the agency for the individual to request a review of that refusal by
the head of the agency or an officer designated by the head of the
agency, and the name and business address of that official;
(3) permit the individual who disagrees with the refusal of the agency to amend his
record to request a review of such refusal ... and notify the individual of the
provisions for judicial review of the reviewing official's determination under
subsection (g)(1)(A) of this section.
Id. § 552a(d)(2)(B) and (3).
322. Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1375-77 (citations and footnote omitted).
323. See Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1245 (8th Cir. 1990) (marshalling cases denying and permitting injunctive relief). "The civil remedies available under the Act are described
in [5 U.S.C. §] 552a(g). Since Congress expressly enumerated in this section where injunctive
relief is available, some courts have refused to expand the availability of injunctive relief to other
violations of the Act." Id.
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Issues Raised in MacArthur Foundation

The divergent interpretations of section 552a(e)(7) articulated by
the majority and the dissent in MacArthur Foundation provide the
theoretical framework for the debate surrounding the provision's law
enforcement activity exception.
1. Statutory Construction of Subsection (e)(7)
The majority in MacArthur Foundation asserted that the phrase
"pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity" modified only the noun "record," not the phrase "maintain
no record. '32 4 Such a gratuitous construction allowed the majority to
evade the president's forceful argument regarding the multiple statutory meanings of the word "maintain" by simply remarking that the
latter's contention "d[id] nothing to change what the adjective 'perti'325
nent' modifies.
In essence, the majority interpreted subsection (e)(7) to mean that a
record need only satisfy the requirements of the law enforcement activity exception when originally "collected:" "Information that was
pertinent to an authorized law enforcement activity when collected
does not later lose its pertinence to that activity simply because the
information is not of current interest ....
,,326 Therefore, by definition, the majority's grammatical construction precluded any inquiry
into the propriety of an agency's continued retention of such a
327
record.
On the other hand, Judge Tatel illustrated that if Congress had desired such a restrictive interpretation of subsection (e)(7), it would
have used the phrase "collect no record," rather than "maintain no
record. ' 328 Accordingly, Judge Tatel read section 552a(e)(7) as requiring that records describing an individual's exercise of First
Amendment rights be "pertinent to and within the scope of an author324. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. The majority's interpretation appears to be in direct conflict with a previous construction
of subsection (e)(7) by the District of Columbia Circuit in Albright v. United States:
The definition of "maintain" is the dispositive factor here. Subsection (e)(7) provides
that any agency that maintains a system of records shall not "maintain [collect, use, or
disseminate any] record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment."
631 F.2d 915, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
328. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 607 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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ized law enforcement activity" both at the time of collection and at
32 9
the time of maintenance.
Judge Tatel's interpretation is persuasive because section 552a(a)(3)
of the Act defines "maintain" as including "maintain, collect, use, or
disseminate. '330 As a fundamental rule of statutory construction, the
Supreme Court assumes that when Congress uses multiple terms, it
does so "because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning."' 33 ' Since Congress employed the specific word
"maintain" in subsection (e)(7), it must be presumed that the legislators intended the term to mean both "maintain" and "collect;" other'332
wise, Congress would have used only the word "collect.
As Judge Tatel accurately noted in his dissent, the majority's interpretation effectively excised the word "maintain" from subsection
(e)(7). 333 Such an interpretation not only ignored both the clear language of the law enforcement activity exception and well-known tenets of statutory construction, but disregarded the explicit legislative
334
intent surrounding the passage of the Act itself.
2.

"Maintenance" Versus "Collection" in Legislative History

The MacArthur Foundation majority rejected the president's contention that the legislative history of subsection (e)(7) supported his
argument that the Act was designed to prevent injuries arising from
the government's maintenance of First Amendment records. 335 In
particular, the majority addressed the president's reliance upon the
following passage from Senate Report 1183: "This section's restraint
is aimed particularly at preventing collection of protected information
not immediately needed, about law-abiding Americans, on the offchance that Government or the particular agency might possibly have
to deal with them in the future. '3 36 The majority claimed that this
329. See id.
330. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(3) (1994).
331. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 608 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)).
332. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 608 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("Because Congress chose
to use the word 'maintain' in section (e)(7), and to define that term as both 'maintain' and
'collect,' we know that Congress must have meant something more than just 'collect."').
333. See id. at 607. The majority's radical interpretation of subsection (e)(7) as referring only
to "collection" (to the exclusion of "maintenance"), despite the fact that Congress employed the
specific word "maintain," violates the maxim of construction that if statutory language is clear
and unambiguous a court must give effect to its plain meaning. See United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 254 (1980).
334. See infra Part IV.C.2.
335. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603-04.
336. S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 57 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6971, and in
SouRcE BooK, supra note 34, at 210.
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passage: (1) actually undermined the president's position with respect
to maintenance because it used only the word "collect;" and (2) did
not reflect congressional intent because it accompanied a preliminary
Senate bill that did not contain the same language as the present sub337
section (e)(7).
The majority's first argument concerning the passage's use of the
word "collect" was directly belied by the text of the very provision the
Report described. Specifically, section 201(b)(7) stated, in pertinent
part: "Each Federal agency that maintains an information system or
file shall, with respect to each such system or file- . . . establish no
program for the purpose of collecting or maintaining information
describing how individuals exercise rights guaranteed by the first
amendment . ...
338 This text indicates that the Senate was just as
concerned with the maintenance of First Amendment records as with
the initial collection of such documents; moreover, Senate Report
1183 made clear that section 201(b)(7) was to be read in conjunction
with section 201(a). 339 Not surprisingly, section 201(a)(1) likewise
contained an express prohibition on maintenance: "Each Federal
agency shall-collect, solicit, and maintain only such personal information as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a statutory purpose of
the agency.

'340

The MacArthur Foundation majority also asserted that the wellknown passage from Senate Report 1183 "d[id] not reflect the intent
of the Congress when it enacted § (e)(7)" because section 201(b)(7) of
the preliminary Senate bill did not contain the same wording as the
provision ultimately enacted. 34 ' Although it is true that the language
of the Senate proposal was modified prior to enactment of subsection
337. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 603-04.
338. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201(b)(7) (1974) (emphasis added), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 129, 130. See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 604 (citing section 201(b)(7) in the
opinion).
339. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 56, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971, and in SOURCE
BooK, supra note 34, at 209 ("This section combined with the application of the principles of
relevancy under subsection 201(a), reflects the preferred status which the Committee intends
managers of information technology to accord to information touching areas protected by the
First Amendment of the Constitution."); cf. id. at 56, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6960, and
in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 198.
[S]ection [201(a)], together with subsection 201(b)(1) and (7), reflects another dimension of the privacy issue, which is that, under our Constitution, there are, or may be,
some human activities of which Government should not take note for any purpose at
all because of the detrimental effect on freedom, and that this is true whether or not the
information is intended to be used to make decisions about specific individuals.
Id. at 45, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6960, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 198.
340. S. 3418 § 201(a)(1), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 128.
341. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 604.
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(e)(7), the same holds true for subsection (e)(4) of House Bill 16373
and its predecessor. 342 As the compromise analysis makes clear,
"[tihe compromise broadens the House provisions [sic] application to
all First Amendment rights and directs the prohibition against the
maintenance of records. ' 343 Should legal scholars therefore ignore
any commentary contained in House Report 1416, as well? If the majority's reasoning is followed on this point, it would eliminate meaningful consideration of most congressional reports.
Almost every appellate court that has extensively addressed the applicability of the law enforcement activity exception has authoritatively cited the foregoing passage from Senate Report 1183 in
determining legislative intent. 344 It is the MacArthur Foundation majority alone that proclaimed that "this particular Senate Report would
be of little value to an understanding of § (e)(7) . . . . 345
Even if the particular passage at issue from Senate Report 1183 was
not binding as to congressional intent, the remaining legislative history, contrary to the majority's grossly inadequate evaluation, 34 6 is replete with concerns about maintenance. For example, House Report
1416, commenting on subsection (e)(4), referred exclusively to "maintenance" when discussing the provision's prohibition with respect to
records concerning one's political or religious beliefs or activities. 347
Similarly, Judge Tatel highlighted the fact that "[i]n debating the lawenforcement amendment to section (e)(7), House members discussed
only the 'maintenance' of records; they did not even refer to collection. ' 348 This observation is particularly significant because the proposal being formally offered on that occasion was the Ichord
Amendment, the present-day law enforcement activity exception. 349
In addition, the erroneous nature of the majority's conclusion that
maintenance was not a paramount concern of legislators in enacting
342. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
343. 120 CONG. REC. 40,406, 40,881 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 860,
988.
344. See Becker v. I.R.S., 34 F.3d 398, 409 (7th Cir. 1994); Patterson v. F.B.I., 893 F.2d 595,
602 (3d Cir. 1990); MacPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Clarkson v. I.R.S.,
678 F.2d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 1982).
345. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 604.
346. See id. (concluding on the basis of one other passage that plaintiff's argument concerning
maintenance "lack[ed] support" in the legislative history).
347. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
348. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 608 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (citing 120 CONG. REc. 36,957
(1974)).
349. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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subsection (e)(7) is graphically illustrated by the following discussion
3 50
contained in Senate Report 1183 regarding section 201(a):
A further consideration where need for collecting data is at issue is
whether records should be retained beyond their period of likely
use for the purposes for which they were originally collected.
A related but more complicated question concerns the continued
existence of files of information which is [sic] no longer supposed to
be used for making decisions about individuals. Many cumulative
records about individuals in various sectors of the organizational
world are filled with facts and evaluations set down in an earlier
time, under a different socio-political ethos. In this setting, it is not
enough to say "from now on we will not.. ."; steps need to be taken
to remove from historical records in high schools, colleges, commercial reporting agencies, law-enforcement files, and other organizations the personal information previously gathered about political,
racial, cultural, and sexual matters that would not be put in the files
under present rules. To the extent that evaluators today have such
records to consult, especially for decisions that are not visible to the
individual, the presence of such35information represents a dead (and
improper) hand from the past. '
3.

The Majority's Policy Arguments

The majority in MacArthur Foundation offered three policy arguments as to why an agency should not be required to purge its files
pursuant to section 552a(e)(7). Each of the arguments is without
merit.
a. The "Floodgates" Argument
The majority alleged that "if federal law enforcement agencies were
required upon request to purge all [First Amendment] records, then
they would surely be inundated with requests to do so."' 352 In making
such a statement, the majority simply recycled an argument that was
previously rejected more than a decade earlier by the Eleventh Circuit
in Clarkson v. IRS. 353 In Clarkson, the IRS similarly claimed that if
the court adopted the plaintiff's construction of subsection (e)(7),
"every piece of paper collected by a government agency w[ould] subject it to a claim for a subsection (e)(7) violation. ' 354 The court re350. Section 201(b)(7) was to be read in conjunction with section 201(a). See supra note 339
and accompanying text.
351. S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 45-46 (1974) (quoting Report of National Academy of Sciences),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6960-61, and in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 198-99.
352. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 604.
353. Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1374.
354. Id. at 1374.
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sponded by stating, "[w]e believe the IRS has seriously overstated its
case .... -355
In practice, 356 the only time an agency would have to purge its file is

after: (1) a requester discovers that the agency maintains a file on him
or her; (2) the requester sues the agency; (3) the document qualifies as
a "record" under the Act;357 (4) the record describes the requester's
exercise of First Amendment activities; 358 (5) the retention of the record is not pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity; (6) the record does not fall within the other two

exceptions to subsection (e)(7); (7) the requester prevails in the district court (and, most likely, in the court of appeals); and (8) the court
orders expungement.

Since the Becker case is the only appellate decision in the twentyfive year history of the Privacy Act where the plaintiffs prevailed on
all these factors, the floodgates argument dries up rather quickly.35 9

b. The Undue Burden Argument
The majority also posited that the president's interpretation of section 552a(e)(7) would place "new and daunting burdens" on government agencies if they "were required to purge its files of information
regarding an individual so requesting whenever it had closed a particular investigation, then its ability to accomplish its mission would inev355. Id.
356. By the express language of subsection (e)(7), agencies are prohibited from maintaining
any records that describe how any individual exercises his or her First Amendment rights unless
one of the statutory exceptions applies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994). In addition, the Act
requires that all records used by agencies in making any determinations about an individual must
be maintained "with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) (1994).
357. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1994).
For purposes of this section-the term "record" means any item, collection, or grouping
of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not
limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or
other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or
photograph.
Id.
358. The court in Clarkson stated: "In order for the prohibition of subsection (e)(7) to apply,
the documents involved must constitute 'records' which implicate an individual's First Amendment rights." Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1374.
359. In addition, as the paucity of appellate Privacy Act decisions indicate, such suits are
rarely litigated because of the individual nature of the action, the costs involved, the lack of
potential monetary recovery, and the large expenditure of time required to fight a court battle
against the government.
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itably suffer. '360 This assertion, however, is directly contradicted by
existing agency policy.
For example, in an attempt to avoid the Seventh Circuit's expungement order in Becker, the IRS, in seeking rehearing, revealed the fact
that it had internal controls in place for purging closed files. 361 In this
regard, the IRS stated that "[t]he files containing the records at issue
are not maintained indefinitely by the IRS. Closed examination files
are subject to the IRS's internal records destruction schedule mandated by its 'Record Control Schedules.' 362 In addition, the current
Internal Revenue Service Handbook enunciates the following policy
concerning "Taxpayer Privacy Rights:"
The IRS is fully committed to protecting the privacy rights of all
taxpayers .... Taxpayers also have the right to expect that the

Service will collect, maintain, use, and disseminate personally identifiable information and data only as authorized by law and as necessary to carry out agency responsibilities ....In its recordkeeping
of his/her
practices, the Service will respect the individual's 3 exercise
63
First Amendment rights in accordance with law.
In light of the fact that agencies such as the IRS already have administrative procedures in place for purging closed files, the majority's
fear concerning "new and daunting burdens" posed by subsection
364
(e)(7) is particularly unfounded.
360. J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. F.B.I., 102 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
361. See Internal Revenue Service's Petition for Rehearing at 12 n.13, Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d
398 (7th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-2475).
362. Id. See id. app. at 20 (containing Records Control Schedule 206 for Service Centers,
Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 1(15)59.26-14 ex. 100-1 (Aug. 10, 1989)).
363. Policies of the Internal Revenue Service Handbook, 1 Internal Revenue Manual, Administrative (CCH) § 1218, at 1016 P-i-1 (Dec. 1998). Interestingly, the wording of this policy statement incorporates each of the terms used in subsection (a)(3)'s definition of the word
"maintain." See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(3). Considering, however, that at the time this policy was
adopted in December, 1993, the IRS was continuing to unlawfully maintain First Amendment
records such as those in described in Becker, one might seriously question the reliability of the
agency's public expression of its newly found commitment to individual privacy.
364. In response to a similar argument by the government in MacPherson, one commentator
remarked as follows:
[T]he government argued that because there is nothing expressed in the Act that requires agencies to delete information identifying innocent people, the IRS had no duty
to delete from its records information identifying MacPherson. Ironically, the government admitted that the IRS had already installed an administrative procedure for evaluating records. Further, the Internal Revenue Manual Handbook dictates that review
procedures should be used to identify and delete irrelevant or unnecessary information.
The court's assertion that it is administratively cumbersome to delete pieces of information from its records is unpersuasive in this context.
Jacobson, supra note 182, at 805 (footnotes omitted).
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c.

Effect of Maintenance on Privacy

Finally, the majority claimed that prohibiting an agency from maintaining First Amendment records contained in a now dormant file
would not "contribute appreciably to individual privacy. ' '365 Such a
conclusion, however, not only ignores the inherent danger in permitting federal agencies to create and maintain citizen dossiers, 366 but evidences an incredible naivete as to the widespread abuses already
3 67
suffered by the American public as a result of such practices.
In fact, an earlier District of Columbia Circuit panel, which included then Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia, commented as follows on
the inevitable damage suffered as a result of the retention of such dormant files: "The mere compilation by the government of records
describing the exercise of First Amendment freedoms creates the possibility that those records will be used to the speaker's detriment, and
hence has a chilling effect on such exercise. ' 368 Similarly, in concluding his dissent on the Privacy Act issue, Judge Tatel stated that "[t]he
fewer unnecessary files describing First Amendment activities the government keeps on law-abiding citizens, the lesser the chance of any
'369
future abuse of those files.
In any event, a simple illustration involving the plight of the alleged
"tax protester" suffices to counter the majority's argument. Due to
the IRS' retention of a dormant file on an individual identified by the
agency as a potential "tax protester," the individual will be periodically red-flagged when he or she files a tax return and will be otherwise subjected to harassment even if he or she has not violated the
0
law. 37
For example, in Becker, the brothers were sent audit notices based
upon the existence of individual tax files opened in their names that
37 1
were filled with prejudicial information about other individuals.
The brothers were apparently targeted on the basis of association
alone, even though they never personally participated (or were even
365. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 605. Judge Tatel stated that he was "unpersuaded by the

court's suggestion that because the Privacy Act limits the use of Lindblom's files, its interpretation of section (e)(7) presents no threat to personal privacy." Id. at 608 (Tatel, J. dissenting).
366. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part II.A.
368. Nagel v. HEW, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cited with approval by MacPherson,
803 F.2d at 484.
369. MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 608 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
370. See supra notes 249-250 and infra notes 371-372 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
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aware of) the particular activities described in the newspaper articles
372
placed in their individual files.
The Becker case provides a stark example of the infringement of
individual privacy that may occur when a government agency is permitted to retain First Amendment records under the pretense that an
investigation is "dormant."
4.

The MacPherson Factor
In MacArthur Foundation,the majority attempted to distinguish its

holding from those in MacPhersonv. IRS 373 and Becker v. IRS374 with

375
respect to the type of file in which the records at issue were kept.
In MacPherson, information regarding a tax attorney was maintained
by the IRS in a "Tax Protestor Project File," rather than in a file identified by the plaintiff's name. 376 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the
agency's maintenance of such material fell within the law enforcement
activity exception under the particular facts of the case. 37 7 The court,
however, was quick to point out that it did not decide a number of
potentially distinguishable situations, including one in which records
378
were retained in a file retrievable under an individual's own name.
In Becker, where the records were kept in the brothers' individual
files, the Seventh Circuit noted that it was not faced with a situation,
as in MacPherson, in which "documents [we]re maintained in a gen'379
eral file rather than in a specific individual's file."
The District of Columbia Circuit majority described as "dicta" the
language in MacPherson and Becker suggesting that the nature of the
file in which information is maintained constituted a factor in determining the propriety of its retention. 3 80 Rather, the majority cursorily
concluded that both cases were inapposite and held that "[n]either
case indicate[d] that an agency may not maintain records relating to
'381
an individual under that individual's name."
In MacPherson,the Ninth Circuit implicitly held that consideration
of the nature of the file in which records were retained was relevant to
determining whether the maintenance of the information was within
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
803 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1986).
34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1994).
J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. F.B.I., 102 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See MacPherson,803 F.2d at 480, 485 n.9.
See id. at 484-85.
See id. at 485 n.9.
Becker, 34 F.3d at 409.
See MacArthur Found., 102 F.3d at 605.
Id.
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"the scope" of an authorized law enforcement activity. 382 The language of subsection (e)(7), however, is silent as to any "MacPherson"
factor. Rather, the statute states that an agency may "maintain no
record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by

the First Amendment.

'383

If the government's ability to retain First

Amendment records was in any way dependent upon the type of file
that the information was kept in, the government could simply transfer prohibited materials into more "acceptable" storage files and
thereby avoid the statutory mandate. 384 Accordingly, future courts
should reject the Ninth Circuit's adoption of this additional factor in
construing section 552a(e)(7).

In this regard, MacPherson was wrongly decided. The outcome of
the attorney's Privacy Act suit should not have hinged upon whether
the notes and tapes of the attorney's speeches were held in a general
"Tax Protestor Project File" or in attorney MacPherson's individual
tax file. 3 85 The information maintained by the IRS clearly described

the exercise of the requester's protected First Amendment activities. 386 Moreover, the court found that the government's surveillance
did not reveal any illegal conduct, nor was the attorney suspected or
accused of any past or anticipated unlawful activity. 38 7 In short, the

plaintiff should have prevailed under section 552a(e)(7).
If the nature of a particular storage file is an appropriate factor in

determining scope, then it should be considered by the courts only as
a factor favoring a plaintiff's request for expungement and not as a
reason justifying the government's maintenance. 388 In other words,
the requester could use this factor as a sword in the battle for privacy,
382. See MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 485 n.9 (listing examples of distinguishable situations that
"might raise additional questions about the 'scope' of the law enforcement activity involved").
383. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1994).
384. Ironically, the MacPherson court itself alluded to this very principle, although in a
slightly different context:
We agree with [the] ...conclusion that records such as those involved in this case fall
within the general proscription of section (e)(7) despite a lack of incorporation into an
agency's system of records. A contrary conclusion would allow government agencies to
evade the section's prohibition simply by keeping individual records in a collective file
untraceable by name but identifiable by nature and content of First Amendment exercise. Such a practice clearly goes against the spirit of the Privacy Act in general and
section (e)(7) in particular.
MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 481.
385. Cf.id. at 485 n.9.
386. See id. at 481 ("The parties agree that the government records describe how MacPherson
,exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment."').
387. See id. at 480.
388. Under this formulation, the attorney in MacPherson would not be penalized because
records regarding his activities were maintained in a "project file," rather than in a file under his
own name, but the brothers in Becker could point to the fact that the prejudicial newspaper
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but an agency could not use it as a shield in defending its retention of
First Amendment records. This solution would prevent the government from manipulating storage procedures to its benefit, while at the
same time promoting the primacy of the First Amendment. 389 As the
Ninth Circuit aptly noted, "a narrow reading of 'law enforcement activities' better serves the goal of privacy and avoids infringing on the
overall First Amendment concerns of section (e)(7)."' 39°
The majority's attempt to distinguish the president's situation from
those of the plaintiffs in MacPherson and Becker was flawed. If any
person had grounds to object to the placement of his First Amendment records, it was the president in MacArthur Foundation. In comparison, the attorney in MacPherson suffered the least infringement of
his privacy rights as a result of the placement of his First Amendment1
39
records in a general project file not directly retrievable by his name.
Although the records at issue in Becker were maintained in the brothers' individual files, the brothers' associational and free speech rights
were implicated only indirectly through the maintenance of others'
records in their tax files. 392 On the other hand, the records concerning
the president were not only contained in a file identified by his name,
but they also described the president's personal exercise of First
Amendment rights.393 In such circumstances, courts should be vigilant in protecting a citizen's privacy rights.
D. Significance of Ichord Amendment
The Ichord Amendment presents the key to unlocking the meaning
of the law enforcement activity exception to section 552a(e)(7). The
language of the amendment was adopted, almost verbatim, as the statutory text. In essence, the Ichord Amendment represents the presentday law enforcement activity exception. 394 The significance of this
amendment, and the narrow interpretation it gives to the exception,
395
has yet to be analyzed by a court of appeals.
Representative Ichord introduced the amendment on November
20, 1974, and formally offered it to the House on the following
articles at issue were maintained in their individual files and, therefore, should justify expungement of the documents because of the stigmatic effect of such storage.
389. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
390. MacPherson, 803 F.2d at 482 (emphasis in original).
391. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.

392. See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
395. See infra notes 420-423 and accompanying text. References to the Ichord Amendment in
the literature are virtually nonexistent. Cf.Jacobson, supra note 182, at 803 nn.66-67, 804 n.70
(referring briefly to amendment in several footnotes).
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day. 396 Significantly, prior to the introduction of this amendment to
proposed subsection (e)(4) of House Bill 16373, Representatives
Moorhead and Dennis vigorously debated the breadth of the existing
provision's prohibition against the maintenance of records concerning
an individual's political or religious beliefs or activities. The latter
congressman repeatedly sought, and was repeatedly given, the former's assurances that subsection (e)(4)'s prohibitions would not prevent the FBI from maintaining records regarding "Communist Party
members or people who belong to organizations which are dedicated
to the violent overthrow of the Government. ' 397 The Ichord Amendment was introduced in order to formally incorporate those verbal as398
surances into the bill itself.
In submitting his amendment to section 552a(e)(4), Representative
Ichord specifically identified two types of groups that he feared would
attempt to use the section's broad prohibition against the maintenance
of political and religious records to avoid scrutiny by federal law enforcement agencies: (1) the Communist Party and other subversive
groups "generally recognized as conspiratorial or clandestine;" and (2)
certain sects of the Black Muslim movement "described... as endangering the internal security. ' ' 39 9 Representative Ichord was concerned
that the former group might claim its conduct was political and the
latter would assert that its activities were religious in nature. 40 0 The
congressman restricted the discussion of his proposal to these two
types of organizations during both the introduction of his amendment
on November 20, and on the occasion of the amendment's formal
40 1
tender the following day.
Most notably, Representative Ichord declared as follows regarding
his "clarifying amendment:"
I want to emphasize-so that there is no misunderstanding-these
changes are designed to protect only legitimate nationalor internal
security intelligence and investigations, and no records or files shall
396. See supra Part II.B.3.
397. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 108-110, 114, and accompanying text.
399. 120 CONG. REC. 36,650 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ichord), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 900-01.
400. See id., reprintedin SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 900-01.
401. See id. at 36,650, 36,957, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 900-01, 929. In
addition, just several days prior to passage of the Act, Representative Ichord again voiced his
grave concerns regarding the threat to domestic security posed by Black Muslim convicts and
"the exploitation of prison unrest by [such] extremist groups seeking to enlist prisoners in revolutionary movements." Id. at 39,967 (Dec. 13, 1974) (referring to recent brutal murder of warden and his deputy by Black Muslim convicts during grievance hearing at Pennsylvania's
Holmesburg Prison).
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be kept on persons which are not within constitutional limitations.
Let the legislative history be explicit. None of these changes are in-

tended to abridge the exercise of first amendment rights. The rights
in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes
of Americans to dissent
40 2
must be preserved.
The scope of the Ichord Amendment was both clear and unambiguous; the amendment permitted the government to maintain First
Amendment records concerning an individual's political or religious
beliefs or activities only when such information was necessary to ensure "legitimate national or internal security" interests. 40 3 Such
records were expressly limited to those involving subversive organizations and groups that threatened America's domestic security; 4°4 otherwise, the government was categorically prohibited from maintaining
405
any records describing the specified First Amendment activities.
Subsequently, the House's prohibition on the maintenance of
records concerning political or religious beliefs or activities was expanded in the compromise bill 40 6 to include records concerning all
First Amendment rights.40 7 Accordingly, subsection (e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exception must, in light of manifest legislative intent, be construed narrowly to mean that the government shall neither
collect nor maintain any First Amendment record concerning any individual unless the gathering or retention of such record is necessary
to protect a legitimate national or internal security interest, such as
preventing the violent overthrow of the government or similar domes40 8
tic uprisings.
Under this historical construction of the Ichord Amendment, none
of the appellate opinions examined in this Comment should have been
decided in favor of the government. 40 9 For example, neither the collection nor the maintenance of records concerning the "tax protest"
speeches of either the law school graduate in Clarkson v. IRS 410 or the
criminal tax attorney in MacPhersonv. IRS411 had anything to do with
preventing the violent overthrow of the state or averting a domestic
402. Id. at 36,651 (emphasis added), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 34, at 902-03.
403. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 399-401 and accompanying text.
405. Unless, of course, the records fell within the subsection's other two exceptions.
406. This expansion was in accord with the Senate provision. See supra notes 82-83, 122 and
accompanying text.
407. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
408. See supra Part II.B.3.
409. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Wabun-Inini does not give sufficient information as to the
nature of the investigation involved to make an assessment. See supra notes 213, 215 and accompanying text.
410. For a discussion of Clarkson, see supra Part II.E.1.
411. For a discussion of MacPherson, see supra Part II.E.3.
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insurrection. In fact, the Tenth Circuit specifically stated that the "advocation of modifying or abolishing our country's tax system is a legitimate activity. Indeed, it is an activity protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment. ' ' 412 Similarly, the FBI's continued retention of a file
concerning a child's grade school project simply defies reason. 413 The
intuitive absurdity of the decision in Patterson v. FBI is graphically
highlighted in the illuminating rays of the Ichord Amendment. 4 14
The only case that might arguably have fallen within the law enforcement activity exception was Jabara v. Webster.4 15 In Jabara,the
FBI alleged that it had cause to believe that the plaintiff, an attorney,
was the member of a terrorist organization. 4 16 Since the FBI and
NSA asserted national security interests, 41 7 their initial collection of
information on the plaintiff might have been justified under the exception. After the FBI closed its investigation of the plaintiff, however, the agency's continued maintenance of such records was in
violation of the Act, especially in light of the district court's finding
that there was no evidence whatsoever linking the attorney with any
past or anticipated criminal act. 418 Likewise, after the FBI in MacArthur Foundation recognized that the president's contacts with dissidents and foreign leaders were innocent, 419 the agency was no longer
warranted in retaining records that described the exercise of the president's First Amendment activities.
Although several appellate courts made passing reference to the
House debate on the law enforcement activity exception, 420 they simply quoted Representative Ichord's November 21, 1974, isolated remark that the amendment was offered "to make certain that political
and religious activities [we]re not used as a cover for illegal or subversive activities. ' 42 1 This passage, which was quoted verbatim in the
412. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985).
413. For a discussion of the Patterson case, see supra Part II.E.4.
414. Cf. supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
415. For a discussion of Jabara, see supra Part II.E.2.
416. See Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1982).
417. See Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 564-65 (E.D. Mich. 1979) vacated and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Instead, the defendants seek to justify their intrusions into the plaintiff's life as a legitimate national security investigation ....
[A]s a part of broader national security investigation, the FBI sought to obtain
information regarding Jabara's bank records.").
418. See id. at 564.
419. For a discussion of MacArthur Foundation,see supra Part III.B.
420. See MacPherson v. I.R.S., 803 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1986); Clarkson v. I.R.S., 678 F.2d
1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982).
421. 120 CONG. REC. 36,957 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ichord), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 34, at 929.
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OMB Guidelines' discussion of subsection (e)(7), 422 is consistently
cited out of context 423 and, in its truncated form, gives the false im-

pression that the exception was designed to dramatically expand the
government's ability to police a citizenry apt to abuse the First

Amendment for nefarious purposes. In reality, the provision was intended to radically restrict the government's ability to collect and

maintain any First Amendment records on American citizens, except
for those documents that were vitally necessary to ensure domestic

tranquility.
Future courts should disregard the erroneous interpretation of the
law enforcement activity exception given in former appellate opinions
and construe the exception narrowly in accord with the express intent
of the Ichord Amendment. In so doing, the court will play a major
role in preventing federal law enforcement agencies from becoming a
greater threat to individual liberty than the subversive organizations
they were allegedly created to monitor.424 In addition, in furtherance
of the congressional mandate expressed in the Act, judges can participate in the salutary process of restoring the First Amendment to the
preferred position that the framers of section 552a(e)(7)
425
envisioned.
V.

IMPACT

The Privacy Act was passed to establish the primacy of the First
Amendment in government record-keeping operations and to ensure
the utmost privacy to American citizens with respect to the exercise of
422. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 133, 420, and accompanying text.
424. See infra Part V.B.
425. For an excellent discussion of the special status conferred upon First Amendment freedoms by the drafters of the Act, see Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 918-19 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
Our reading of the Act [namely, subsection (e)(7)] is also consistent with what we
perceive to be the congressional intent. Congress is, of course, well aware of the special
and sensitive treatment accorded First Amendment rights under the interpretive case
law. The legislative history of the Act reveals Congress' own special concern for the
protection of First Amendment rights ....
Similarly, although not expressly provided for in the Constitution, courts have long
recognized that "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion." This penumbra of privacy can be invaded, under certain circumstances, by the mere inquiry of government into an individual's exercise of First
Amendment rights. Thus, it is not surprising that Congress would have provided in this
Act, dedicated to the protection of privacy, that an agency may not so much as collect
information about an individual's exercise of First Amendment rights except under
very circumscribed conditions.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
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these cherished guarantees. 426 In this regard, Congress was not only
concerned with the initial collection of such records, but was equally
fearful of the government's continued retention of this private infor427
mation once gathered.
A.

Viability of Privacy Act Protections at Stake

If the District of Columbia Circuit majority's decision in MacArthur
Foundation is followed, government agencies will be free to maintain
voluminous files describing the First Amendment activities of American citizens with impunity. Since the majority's interpretation of section 552a(e)(7) focuses exclusively on the initial collection of First
Amendment records, and thereby precludes any inquiry into the propriety of the information's subsequent maintenance, 428 agencies will
be constrained in their retention policies by nothing more than their
boundless discretion.
In essence, the majority's inaccurate construction of subsection
(e)(7) allows the narrowly intended "law enforcement activity" exception to swallow the rule, a concern aptly noted by the Eleventh Circuit
in its seminal opinion in Clarkson v. IRS.429 Under the majority's interpretation, it would be virtually impossible for an individual ever to
prevail under the Act because federal law enforcement agents could
always, in hindsight, assert a facial justification as to why they initially
430
desired a particular record.
426. See supra Part II.A.
427. See supra Part IV.C.2.
428. See supra Part IV.C.1.
429. 678 F.2d at 1374 n.9 (citing commentators' observations that the breadth of the law enforcement activity exception "opens a loophole that threatens to swallow the rule" and "may
well perpetrate those 'fishing expeditions' that subsection (e)(7) is designed to preclude" (quoting GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACy Acrs 46, 74-75 n.70 (R.

Bouchard & J. Franklin eds., 1980))).
430. Several appellate courts have commented sympathetically on the plight of FOIA and
Privacy Act plaintiffs faced with the task of responding to an agency's claims about documents
that they have never seen. In Patterson v. FBI, the court remarked:
Thus, the public record consisted of certain redacted documents initially released by the
FBI, a few answers to interrogatories, and four affidavits ....We can appreciate Todd's
objections to the anomalous situation of having to defend against a motion for summary judgment without being privy to the very documents necessary for such a defense.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which has considered a significant number
of FOIA cases, has commented on how "[tihis lack of knowledge by the party seeing
[sic] disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our legal system's
form of dispute resolution."
893 F.2d 595, 600 (3rd Cir. 1990) (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Similarly, in discussing whether to review such records cases de novo or under the "clearly
erroneous" standard, the Seventh Circuit stated:
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For example, in support of its collection of records in Becker,43 1 the
IRS iterated the United States Supreme Court's statement in United
States v. Powel 432 that all citizens can be investigated by the agency

"on suspicion that the [tax] law is being violated, or even just because
[the IRS] wants assurancethat it is not."'433 It is not difficult to see how
such a low-threshold standard would thoroughly emasculate subsec-

tion (e)(7)'s protections under the majority's paralyzing
interpretation.
In short, if the MacArthur Foundation majority's pro-law enforcement construction is adopted, section 552a(e)(7) will become nothing
more than a hollow platitude.
B.

Dictatorshipof Dossiers Will Prevail

If the government is free to retain records concerning the political,
religious, and other protected activities of Americans without the
slightest degree of meaningful scrutiny by its citizenry, Americans'
personal beliefs and private associations will soon become the favorite

subject of government dossiers. 434 Such secret files will be accessible
through computerized federal data banks to an expanding police force
of bureaucrats armed with increased powers and immunities. At first,
Although procedurally the issue of whether documents are exempt under FOIA is
often brought before a district court by motion for summary judgment, as in this case,
there is some tension with the rules applying to summary judgment and review thereof.
Whether the documents to be considered are all before the court (or whether a reasonable search has been made) and whether documents are exempt is often determined on
the basis of affidavits by agency employees (and lack of access to the agency documents
limits the opportunity of the requesting party to obtain affidavits showing any conflict).
The issue whether a document is exempt will often involve interpretation of the document vis-a-vis the standards for exemption and in the light of the background of the
matter. The opportunity of the requesting party to argue that issue is limited by the
fact that he or she does not know the contents of the document withheld or its redacted
portion (except as suggested by a Vaughn index, if one has been created) and he or she
may not be familiar with some of the background facts.
Becker v. I.R.S., 34 F.3d 398, 402 n.11 (7th Cir. 1994).
In addition, plaintiffs are further hampered in challenging government claims because they are
consistently denied the right to conduct any discovery prior to responding to agency summary
judgment motions-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) notwithstanding. See id. at 405-06; see
also J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. F.B.I., 102 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf.FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(f) (providing that, in situation in which party opposing summary judgment motion cannot
meaningfully respond, court "may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had").
431. See United States' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary
filed Oct. 10, 1991).
Judgment at 5, Becker v. IRS, Nos. 91 C 1203-1205 (N.D. I11.
432. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
433. Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)) (emphasis added).
434. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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such files will be used to create profiles, then innocent citizens engaging in lawful dissent and protest will be harassed, persecuted, and se435
lectively prosecuted.
The creation of citizen dossiers is not just an evil in itself; the more
information that federal law enforcement agencies compile, the more
vigorously these government bureaucracies will press for legislation
criminalizing speech and other forms of protest under the guise of
"public safety." In turn, such enactments allow federal agents to become even more intrusive by permitting them to amass greater
amounts of personal data and assist in justifying the continued existence and power of the agencies themselves.
The majority's decision in MacArthur Foundation constitutes a direct attack upon the most precious First Amendment guarantees. Although the individual outcome of this case may not, at first blush,
seem particularly onerous, the chain reaction that could result from its
adoption as precedent is truly frightening to a society nurtured on
freedom.
If the government is allowed to maintain dossiers on the private
beliefs and associations of innocent citizens, these individuals will
soon cease to express their views in public for fear of government
scrutiny and persecution. Lawful dissent will be forced underground,
and two societies will develop. One will be the artificial society controlled by the state and enforced by its police. 436 The second will percolate under the oppression of the former and will embody the
genuine, but unspoken, feelings of a populace that is forced to meet in
secret and converse warily on subjects forbidden by legislative fiat.
Such an arrangement will inevitably lead to violent confrontation because the people will be deprived of a public forum in which to speak
freely and voice their grievances. In the words of President Kennedy,
"[t]hose who make peaceful evolution impossible make violent
revolution inevitable. ' 437 This is the paradox of the police state.
Under the guise of protecting the public from itself, the state, in its
435. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
436. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Eugene M. Fisher, The Changing Times: A Basic Survey of
Dissent in America Society, in THE LAW OF DIsSENT AND RiOTs 25, 35 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1971).
[T]he Establishment seeks to perpetuate itself. In this effort, it stands together against
every threat to the existing order. It uses every available political agency and all the
organs of the established social order to resist-and, where possible, to stifle-every expression of dissent that may seem to the dominant members of the Establishment dangerously revolutionary.
Id.
437. Id. (quoting statement of President John F. Kennedy).
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attempt to compel absolute conformity to its dictates, creates a situathe citition so suffocating to liberty that there is no option but for
438
tyranny.
unbearable
regime's
the
against
retaliate
to
zenry
438. See id. at 25. A similar phenomenon has been described in the context of social dissent:
Social dissent endangers the entire social and economic structure because it seeks to
revise or even to destroy the attitudes, ideas, and principles upon which the social system is built ....

That fear, in itself, breeds repressive governmental action likely to

ignite violent counteraction by dissenters.
Id.
Lest one trivialize the danger of government dossiers, it is instructive to recall the massacre of
Polish officers and intelligentsia at Katyn Forest by the Soviets:
At Katyn and elsewhere in the spring of 1940... the Soviet secret police, the N.K.V.D.,
had liquidated fifteen thousand Polish officers and intellectuals captured during the
Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 and recently removed from the prison
camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov. These men, their hands trussed in
barbed wire and expertly shot with a single bullet in the back of the head, had been
buried in mass graves.
DAVID IRVING, NUREMBERG: THE LAST BATTLE 36 (1996). What is noteworthy about these
mass executions is not the manner in which the Poles were shot, but the fact that those killed
were each selected because of their individual character and potential for resistance to the Soviet
state. See RUSSELL GRENFELL, UNCONDITIONAL HATRED 188 (1953) (quoting July 1952 report

of United States congressional committee that the massacre of over 4,000 Poles at the Katyn
Forest "was a calculated plot to eliminate all Polish leaders who subsequently would have opposed the Soviet's plans for communising Poland"); F.J.P. VEALE, ADVANCE TO BARBARISM 187

(1953); see also 108 CONG. REC. 8279-81 (1962) (statement of Rep. Derwinski) (chronicling investigative efforts of select House committee on the Katyn massacre). In the words of Solzhenitsyn, "[t]hey took those who were too independent, too influential . . . too intelligent, too
noteworthy; they took, particularly, many Poles from former Polish provinces. (It was then that
ill-fated Katyn was filled up .... )." 1 ALEKSANDR I. SoLzHEqrrsYN, THE GULAG ARCI-IIPELAGO, 1918-1956, at 77 (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1973). See DOENITZ AT NUREMBERG: A RE-

APPRAISAL xxii (H.K. Thompson, Jr. & Henry Strutz eds., 1983) (quoting DAN V. GALLERY,
TWENTY MILLION TONS UNDER THE SEA, epilogue (1957)).
At Nuremberg, mankind and our present civilization were on trial, with men whose
own hands were bloody sitting on the judges' seats. One of the judges came from the
country which committed the Katyn Forest massacre and produced an array of witnesses to swear at Nuremberg that the Germans had done it.
Id. Cf. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRiBUNAL 54 (1947) (containing formal charge pertaining to death of Polish officers at the Katyn
Forest). What is chilling about Katyn is the realization that the victims of this slaughter were
earmarked for death based upon a calculated assessment of their characters and beliefs, the very
purpose for which dossiers are compiled.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court pointed out that
"[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. It seems
trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid
these ends by avoiding these beginnings." 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). Interestingly, these poignant words were penned by Justice Robert H. Jackson, later appointed American Chief Counsel
at Nuremberg, contemporaneously with the discovery of mass graves at Katyn and the subsequent exhumation of thousands of bodies. Compare id. at 624, with ALFRED M. DEZAYAS, THE
WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BUREAU, 1939-1945 228 (1989) (noting that the exhumation of 4,143
bodies at Katyn Forest took place during short period from April to June 1943).
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The Privacy Act is a significant safeguard that individuals retain in
order to protect fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. Specifically, the Act provides the means by which citizens may seek redress in the courts to uphold their First Amendment
freedoms. 439 If the Act's integral protections are subverted to the degree sanctioned by the majority in MacArthur Foundation,Americans
may soon find themselves in a country that they no longer know,
afraid to speak out publicly for fear of being recorded, reluctant to
express their views privately because their neighbors might report
them to the authorities, and powerless to peaceably prevent their paid
servants from becoming the agents of their destruction.4 0
CONCLUSION

In light of the critical importance of free expression and privacy to
America's republican form of government, the Supreme Court should
adopt the faithful interpretation given to section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exception by the Seventh Circuit in Becker and by
Judge Tatel in his thoughtful dissent in MacArthur Foundation. In addition, the Court should emphatically reject the aberrant majority decision in MacArthur Foundation. The Court should also clarify the
narrow parameters of subsection (e)(7)'s law enforcement activity exception in accord with the restrictive intent of the Ichord Amendment.
Such an action would end the considerable confusion between the circuits with respect to the appropriate standard that should be applied
441
in construing the exception.
If the Court, however, fails to reaffirm the primacy of the First
Amendment's protections surrounding speech and association, the
Privacy Act will degenerate into nothing more than a statutory subterfuge used for surreptitious spying on the most precious of America's
remaining liberties.
Steven W. Becker

439. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1994).
440. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
441. See Becker v. I.R.S., 34 F.3d 398, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); see also supra
Part II.E.
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